The Design of Performance Pay in Education by Derek Neal
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I thank participants at the 2009 Handbook of Economics of Education Conference in Munich for helpful
feedback. I thank Gadi Barlevy, Robert Gibbons, Canice Prendergast, and Phil Reny for useful conversations
and guidance. I thank Luca Maini, Eric Nielsen, Armin Rick, and Richard Olson for excellent research
assistance. I thank the Searle Freedom Trust for research support. I also thank Lindy and Michael Keiser
for research support through a gift to the University of Chicago’s Committee on Education. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Derek Neal. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.The Design of Performance Pay in Education
Derek Neal




This chapter analyzes the design of incentive schemes in education while reviewing empirical studies
that evaluate performance pay programs for educators. Several themes emerge. First, it is difficult
to use one assessment system to create both educator performance metrics and measures of student
achievement. To mitigate incentives for coaching, incentive systems should employ assessments that
vary in both format and item content. Separate no-stakes assessments provide more reliable information
about student achievement because they create no incentives for educators to take hidden actions that
contaminate student test scores. Second, relative performance schemes are rare in education even though
they are more difficult to manipulate than systems built around psychometric or subjective performance
standards. Third, assessment-based incentive schemes are mechanisms that complement rather than
substitute for systems that promote parental choice, e.g. vouchers and charter schools.
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d-neal@uchicago.eduThe vast majority of elementary and secondary schools in most countries
are publicly funded. Therefore, the study of the design of incentive systems
employed in education is primarily the study of how governments structure
the institutions and mechanisms used to procure a speciﬁc type of service. In
democratic countries, the study of incentive design in education may also in-
clude explorations of agency problems that exist between voters and the elected
oﬃcials that design these mechanisms.1 However, in this chapter, I ignore these
latter issues and focus on the design challenges that face a benevolent public
education authority that seeks to maximize the welfare generated from public
expenditures on education.
In broad terms, the personnel policies in most ﬁrms are designed, at least in
part to solve two problems. Firms must select and assign workers appropriately
and then elicit eﬃcient eﬀort from them. If one treats schools as ﬁrms, the ﬁrst
problem involves the screening and assignment of teachers. Systems that create
links between measures of teacher performance and the retention of teachers or
the granting of tenure inﬂuence the distribution of talent among persons who
occupy teaching jobs in equilibrium. Because the personnel policies employed
in most public school systems create only weak links between teacher perfor-
mance and retention or tenure decisions, scholars and reform advocates often
cite existing tenure and retention policies as a potential source of ineﬃciency in
personnel policies.2 Nonetheless, systems that directly link retention and tenure
decisions to measures of teacher performance have not yet been implemented
on a large scale. Thus, my discussion below is restricted to simulation results
that may help shed light on the potential eﬀects of various reforms to tenure
and retention policies. To date, there are no empirical studies that evaluate the
eﬀects of performance based promotion and retention systems.
A large section of this chapter examines the eﬀects of performance pay sys-
tems that are designed to induce more eﬀort from teachers. Although few in-
centive systems in education are currently employed as screening devices, many
existing systems represent attempts to solve moral hazard problems between
teachers and education authorities. Teachers typically work in a setting where
the majority of their actions are hidden from their supervisors and where the
contextual information that determines the eﬃcient choice of actions at any
point in time is also often hidden from their supervisors. In this setting, it is
prohibitively expensive to write forcing contracts that specify desired actions
for each potential classroom setting and then provide the monitoring required
to make sure that these desired actions are taken.
Faced with these monitoring problems, education authorities may pursue
one of two strategies. They can pay educators ﬂat salaries and seek to shape
the eﬀort choices of educators through professional development and the pro-
cesses used to screen and recruit teachers, or they can link incentive payments to
some measure of educator performance. In recent decades, education authorities
throughout the world have begun to experiment with the latter approach, and
1See Dixit (2002).
2See Ballou and Podgursky (1997) for an extensive treatment of the features of hiring and
tenure processes in public schools that appear ineﬃcient.the existing literature contains many papers that evaluate the impacts of vari-
ous teacher incentive programs. However, at this point, the literature contains
few papers that formally explore the design of incentive systems for educators.
I argue here that the designs of many performance pay schemes in education
create ineﬃcient allocations of teacher eﬀort, and a careful review of the em-
pirical literature on the results of various performance pay schemes reveals that
these eﬀort distortions often occur in predictable ways.
Most performance pay schemes in education are constructed as contests
against predetermined performance standards, in which teachers receive rewards
if their measured performance exceeds a speciﬁed target. A large literature notes
that such schemes are problematic when teachers can take actions that inﬂate
the measured achievement of their students relative to their students’ true skill
levels, and I devote considerable attention to this issue. However, I also note
that the tasks of choosing the psychometric performance standards used in such
contests and maintaining the integrity of these standards over time are diﬃ-
cult ones. Variation in student assessment results reﬂects not only variation in
educator performance but also variation in the backgrounds and aptitudes of
students. Systems that do not correctly control for student characteristics in
the creation of performance targets for educators create incentives for educators
to avoid certain types of students or schools. In addition, no existing contest
schemes contain procedures that adjust performance standards over time to
reﬂect secular progress in available teaching methods. Finally, there is con-
siderable suggestive evidence that performance standards can be compromised
by testing agencies that make changes to assessment content or the scaling of
assessments over time that compromise the meaning of psychometric scales.
Performance pay schemes built around subjective performance evaluation
avoid the technical problems involved in setting statistical performance stan-
dards, but these systems have not worked well in practice. Two recent studies
suggest that when one group of government educators evaluates the perfor-
mance of another group of government educators subjectively, performance pay
schemes may well morph into increases in base pay for teachers that are not
accompanied by improvements in teacher performance.
Even if we assume that an education authority has access to a set of perfor-
mance metrics that do isolate variation in educator performance relative to the
current pedagogical frontier, a simple model of pay for performance contests
shows that education authorities can waste resources by setting performance
standards either too low or too high relative to the levels that induce eﬃcient
eﬀort. Systems that set standards too low either pay more in prize money than
is required given the eﬀort they elicit or elicit less than eﬃcient eﬀort levels or
both. Further, systems that set standards too high can be especially wasteful
because some educators respond by keeping eﬀort levels low and treating the
incentive system as a lottery. Circumstantial evidence suggests that designers
of recent systems have, in some cases, set performance standards well above
eﬃcient levels, and in other cases, set them far below eﬃcient levels.
In contrast to performance pay schemes built around ﬁxed performance stan-
dards, relative performance schemes often elicit more useful information for two
2reasons. First, the evolution of the distribution of measured performance among
educators over time can provide information about how the education produc-
tion frontier is evolving over time. Further, systems that involve competition
among educators for a ﬁxed pool of reward money cannot easily be manipu-
lated into a means of raising base pay for an entire population of teachers who
make no changes in their eﬀort levels. Nonetheless, relative performance in-
centive schemes are rare in education and thus far have been mostly conﬁned
to the realm of short-term experiments. Although these experiments produced
some encouraging results, there are no large scale relative pay for performance
schemes in operation at this time.
Many accountability and performance pay systems employ test scores from
assessment systems that produce information used not only to determine re-
wards and punishments for educators but also to inform the public about secu-
lar progress in student learning. As long as education authorities keep trying to
accomplish both of these tasks with one set of assessments, they will continue to
fail at both tasks. If the goal of assessing students is to measure trends in secu-
lar achievement, separate no-stakes assessments provide information that is not
likely to be contaminated by hidden actions. However, when authorities use one
set of assessment results for both incentive pay and student assessment, educa-
tors face incentives to take numerous hidden actions that simultaneously inﬂate
their own measured performance and contaminate information about levels of
student achievement.
If education authorities implement separate assessment systems for perfor-
mance incentives and student assessment, they still face the possibility that
educators will engage in wasteful hidden actions that manipulate the results of
tests used to determine performance pay, but authorities can mitigate some of
these concerns by linking performance pay to the results of assessments that
contain no year to year overlap in item content or format. This design elim-
inates the incentive for teachers to engage in coaching behaviors that do not
build lasting skills but simply prepare students for a particular set of questions
or test formats. Although assessments without repeated items and common
formats cannot be readily placed on a common psychometric scale, the ordi-
nal content of these assessment results can be used to implement performance
contest schemes that elicit eﬃcient eﬀort from teachers.
Throughout much of the chapter, I consider an education authority that
employs many teachers in many diﬀerent schools and seeks to design personnel
policies that screen and motivate teachers. However, the ﬁnal sections of the
chapter consider the design of incentive systems that operate at the school
level, and I discuss how governments can design systems that require schools to
compete for public support. Seen through this lens, voucher systems, charter
schools, and other systems that expand school choice are complements to and
not substitutes for incentive systems built around assessment results.
31 Screening Teachers
A large empirical literature documents the fact that measured teacher produc-
tivity varies greatly among teachers, holding constant observed characteristics of
their students and their school environments. However, it is diﬃcult to use ob-
served characteristics of candidate teachers to predict who will actually perform
well in the classroom.3 This later ﬁnding is consistent with two diﬀerent views
of the information structure in teacher labor markets. The ﬁrst view contends
that candidate teachers know whether or not they will be eﬀective teachers,
but they cannot directly reveal this information to prospective employers in a
credible way. In this asymmetric information scenario, personnel policies must
be designed in ways that induce teachers to reveal their ability type indirectly.
A second view is that neither a new teacher or her principal knows how eﬀec-
tive she will be and that both parties learn about her eﬀectiveness as she gains
experience. In this symmetric learning scenario, personnel policies dictate how
teacher compensation evolves as new information about her productivity is re-
vealed and also whether or not she will be allowed to continue teaching given
her performance record.
For the purpose of this chapter, I adopt the second view and consider the
design of policies that maximize the output of teachers employed at a point in
time as well as the sequence of teachers who will occupy a given position over
time. I return below to the question of how pay should vary with measured
performance. For now, I focus on the issue of whether or not teachers should
be allowed to continue teaching based on their past record.
Rockoﬀ and Staiger (2010) make the ﬁrst formal attempt to derive ﬁring rules
that maximize the steady-state ouput of teachers in a school district. They note
that the measured productivity of teachers varies greatly among teachers and
that existing research suggests that current hiring and screening procedures in
public schools may do little to narrow the dispersion of productivity among
new teachers.4 They also note that the most important cost of replacing teach-
ers after one or two years on the job is that new teachers typically perform
signiﬁcantly worse than teachers with one or two years of experience.
Using a set of assumptions about the reliability of measured teacher perfor-
mance, the dispersion in teacher performance, the returns to early experience,
and the rate of exogenous exits from teaching, Rockoﬀ and Staiger derive opti-
mal ﬁring rules under various assumptions about how many years teachers teach
before school districts make an up or down decision on their retention. They
choose rules that maximize the steady state average productivity per teacher,
which is equivalent to maximizing the steady state total output of the school
system since they are holding constant the number of teaching positions in their
hypothetical school system.
The policy recommendations that Rockoﬀ and Staiger produce are quite
diﬀerent from current practice in modern schools systems. They consider a
3See Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2003), Rockoﬀ (2004), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain
(2005), and Hanushek and Rivkin (2006).
4See Ballou and Podgursky (1997).
4number of diﬀerent scenarios that involve diﬀerent tenure clocks, variances of
measurement error in teacher productivity, and hiring costs. However, they
always conclude that school systems should dismiss at least two thirds of each
new cohort of teachers during their ﬁrst few years of experience.
The Rockoﬀ and Staiger approach is based on a steady state analysis that
involves the following thought experiment: for any retention policy that de-
scribes when teachers will be retained or dismissed based on their history of
measured performance, derive the steady state distribution of teacher quality
in the system. Then, choose the policy that maximizes average steady state
teacher quality.
It is not clear that this exercise is the most relevant for policy analysis. If a
given school system adopted a Rockoﬀ and Staiger retention policy today that
applied to new hires but existing teachers continued to enjoy the same employ-
ment protection they enjoy now, it could easily take 20 years for the system
to approach the steady state that Rockoﬀ and Staiger describe. A diﬀerent
and possibly more relevant approach is to consider the policy that maximizes
the expected discounted value of teacher quality generated by the sequence of
teachers who will occupy a position that is open today. Further, because it is
standard in the literature to assume that individual teacher productivity is not
inﬂuenced by the quality of her co-workers, the optimal rule for one position is
the optimal rule for all positions
Rockoﬀ and Staiger note that most of the returns to experience among teach-
ers come, on average, quite early in their careers. They conclude that the exist-
ing literature implies that the performance of ﬁrst year teachers is on average
roughly .47 standard deviations below the average quality of experienced teach-
ers,5 but teachers with one year of experience perform almost as well as more
experienced teachers, and the returns to experience appear to be roughly zero
after two years of experience. Here, I ignore the small returns to experience
in year two and focus on the larger returns to experience in the ﬁrst year of
teaching. Under the assumption that the education authority is risk neutral
and that the authority is maximizing the present discounted value of teacher
quality measured in standard deviation units, the assumption that new teachers
are, on average .47 standard deviations less productive than experienced teach-
ers is equivalent to the assumption that the authority must pay a search cost of
.47 to ﬁre an experienced teacher and hire a new one. Thus, if one ignores any
eﬀects of experience after the ﬁrst year, the retention policy problem facing an
education authority can be described using a well-known model of job matching.
Let  denote the true productivity of a given teacher.  is not observed di-
rectly, but each period t that a teacher works, the education authority observes
a productivity signal, xt. In year one, x1 =  :47 +  + "1. For years t > 1 ,
xt =  + "t. Here, "t represents measurement error or some other transitory
component of measured productivity. For all t = 1;2;::;1, "t is drawn iden-
5According to Rockoﬀ and Staiger (2010), a one standard deviation improvement in teacher
quality is associated with roughly a .15 standard deviation increase in expected student
achievement, and on average, the students of rookie teachers perform about .07 standard
deviations below students of experienced teachers.
5tically and independently over time and teachers. The model is denominated
in standard deviation units of teacher quality. Assume that   N(0;1) and
that "t  N(0;2
") 8t. Let mt be the posterior belief about expected produc-
tivity of a given teacher based on the history of her measured performance,
(xt 1;xt 2;::;x1), and let t equal the precision of the authority’s beliefs about
teacher quality at the beginning of year t of her career. Teachers never die in
this model, but there is an exogenous probability, , that a teacher leaves teach-
ing in a given period for reasons unrelated to her productivity. Finally, let  be
the authority’s discount rate.
The timing of events is as follows: the authority hires a new teacher. At the
end of the teacher’s ﬁrst period of work, the authority observes x1 and forms
(m2;2). The authority then either allows the teacher to work another period
or ﬁres the teacher and hires a new teacher. If the authority retains the teacher,
the authority repeats the same review and retention decision process at the
end of the teacher’s second period of work using both signals, (x1;x2), and the
same process repeats in future periods. At the beginning of each period, the
education authority is trying to maximize the expected present value of teacher
productivity generated by the teachers who ﬁll a particular slot. The Bellman
equation that describes the problem facing the education authority is:
V (mt;t) = max[V0; mt + (1   )E [V (mt+1;t+1)jmt] + V0]
Here, V (mt;t) is the value of having a current teacher with t 1 periods of
experience and a history of productivity such that mt = E(jxt 1;xt 2;:::x1),
and V0 = V (0;1) is the expected value of hiring a new teacher.6
Many readers may recognize that I have characterized the education au-
thority’s problem using Jovanovic’s (1979) model of job matching. Jovanovic
describes how a worker optimally searches for a job when he believes that his
potential match with each new job comes from the same distribution. I use the
model to describe how an education authority optimally ﬁlls a vacancy when the
authority believes that each new teacher is drawn from the same productivity
distribution.7 The Jovanovic model is well-known in labor economics, and it is
well established that the optimal policy for the authority is to choose a set of
cutoﬀ values, (r1;r2;r3;::), such that teachers are dismissed at the end of period
t if mt < rt. As long as one assumes that a teacher’s actions only aﬀect output
in her own classroom, the authority can maximize the expected present value
of total productivity in the school system by using this same policy to ﬁll all
teaching positions.
I have solved this model using the parameters for  and 2
" that Rockoﬀ
and Staiger employ, and to simplify the numerical analysis, I assume no teacher
works more than thirty years.8 Given the exogenous quit rate of  = :05, this
6t is only a function of t because this is a normal learning problem.
7Jovanovic (1979) assumes that workers receive all the surplus for employer-employee
matches. I am assuming that there is a ﬁxed wage for teachers that the authority must pay
to any teacher that ﬁlls a slot. Thus, the authority simply wants to maximize the expected
present value of productivity generated by each teaching slot.
8 = :05 and 2
" = 1:5, which implies a reliability ratio of .4
6assumption has virtually no aﬀect on the optimal cutoﬀs early in a teacher’s
career. The Jovanovic approach diﬀers conceptually from Rockoﬀ and Staiger’s
steady-state analysis because it explicitly incorporates discounting and because
it imposes no tenure clock. As Rockoﬀ and Staiger acknowledge, policies that
maximize steady-state payoﬀs do not properly discount the returns that occur in
steady-state. The main cost of ﬁring a teacher is the poor expected performance
of the new replacement teacher. This cost is paid today. However, if we assume
that existing teachers would continue to enjoy their current employment protec-
tions following any changes to the tenure system for new teachers, the beneﬁts
of a higher steady-state average teacher quality would come decades from now.
Further, rules that force up or out tenure decisions early in a teacher’s career
raise optimal promotion standards because the education authority cannot cor-
rect the mistake of giving tenure to a candidate who is later revealed to be less
than deserving.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Jovanovic simulations yield much more
conservative dismissal policies than those produced by the Rockoﬀ and Staiger
simulations. Exact dismissal rates vary with parameter choices, but the typical
set of rules implies that roughly ﬁfty percent of new teachers should be dismissed
after one year and small fractions of new teachers should be dismissed in years
two through six of their tenure with roughly forty percent of new teachers never
facing dismissal. Nonetheless, both simulations suggest more stringent ﬁring
rules than we currently observe in most public school systems.9 Thus, it is
important to consider whether or not these simulations form a solid basis for
considering drastic changes in personnel practices.
Although both exercises provide interesting starting points for broader re-
search on retention policy, both also share important common shortcomings.
First, if public schools adopt aggressive ﬁring policies, schools may have to raise
salaries to maintain the current quality of their applicant pool. It is not clear
how elastic the quality constant supply of potential teachers is, but it is certainly
a key consideration for any policy makers who contemplate following Rockoﬀ
and Staiger’s advice. Second, the more important assumption built into both
sets of simulations is that teacher productivity is a ﬁxed trait that does not
vary with teacher eﬀort other than through mechanical learning by doing. The
simulation exercises described here help us think about some of the costs of the
current hiring and ﬁring procedures in public schools, but those who take the
resulting dismissal rules seriously as viable policy prescriptions are implicitly or
explicitly embracing the view that diﬀerences in measured teacher productivity
are entirely due to diﬀerences in teacher talent and not diﬀerences in teacher
eﬀort.
Given this starting point, the only way to deal with low performing teach-
ers is to terminate them. Better incentive provision has no value. However,
this view of personnel policy is rather extreme given the existing literature on
9Work by Adams (1997) implies that total separations among young teachers are likely
around half the levels of dismissals implied by the rules generated by the Jovanovic simulations.
Thus, even if one assumes that all current teachers who quit are being forced out, the implied
dismissal rates in the data are quite diﬀerent than those implied by either set of simulations.
7professional labor markets generally, and it also reﬂects a false interpretation of
some well known results from the empirical literature on teacher productivity.
The fact that teachers vary in terms of their measured productivity does not
imply anything about whether or not most teachers provide socially eﬃcient
levels of eﬀort given their talent or whether or not it is possible to improve the
entire distribution of teacher productivity through the use of incentives. Further,
while the evidence on heterogeneous teacher productivity surely reﬂects a degree
of true talent heterogeneity among teachers, it may also reﬂect diﬀerences among
teachers in their own personal eﬀort norms. Given the absence of incentive pay
and the level of job security protections in many public school settings, these
diﬀerences in personal norms could be an important source of ex post diﬀerences
in teacher performance.
The distinction between talent heterogeneity and norm heterogeneity is im-
portant when one is trying to forecast the expected beneﬁts from better in-
centive provision for teachers. If bad teachers are simply teachers who are not
able to learn how to teach well, then better performance pay schemes should
yield negligible improvements in the distribution of teacher performance. On
the other hand, if bad teachers are teachers who are not motivated to take the
steps required to teach well, then improvements in the design of incentives may
generate signiﬁcant improvements in the distribution of teacher performance
without signiﬁcant increases in total teacher compensation.
Finally, the types of ﬁring rules discussed here can never operate only as
screening mechanisms. Policies that link retention decisions to measures of
teacher performance should induce more eﬀort from teachers,10 and if diﬀer-
ences in eﬀort norms are important ex ante, the introduction of these policies
should alter the ex post distribution of teacher productivity. In fact, it seems
reasonable to conjecture that, if a school system announced even the Jovanovic
style dismissal rules that I describe above, the administrators of this system
would observe that the threat of dismissal alters the distribution of teacher pro-
ductivity by compressing diﬀerences in teacher eﬀort levels among teachers who
share the same talent level. In this scenario, the dismissal rules announced ex
ante would no longer be optimal ex post because key parameters in the simula-
tion would be inﬂuenced by the change in policy.11
There is little evidence that existing hiring procedures in public schools
work well as mechanisms for identifying candidates who will perform well in
the classroom. Further, many public school teachers receive tenure in almost
a perfunctory manner quite early in their careers.12 These observations give
10The analyses presented here rest on the assumption that teachers earn more than they
could in other jobs requiring the same eﬀort levels. If no teachers are earning rents, then it
is hard to imagine how any changes in personnel policies could improve teacher performance
without spending more money on teacher salaries.
11Technically, the simulations that I conducted and that Rockoﬀ and Staiger conducted
suﬀer from the same problem because estimates of the variance of teacher value-added are
taken from the existing stock of current teachers. However, the Rockoﬀ and Staiger agenda
is motivated by the view that there is now a weak correlation at best between being a poor
performing teacher and a teacher that leaves teaching.
12See Ballou and Podgursky (1997).
8credence to the notion that better screening and retention polices could yield
large gains in teacher productivity. However, the combination of perfunctory
tenure, civil service employment protections, and civil service salary schedules
also suggest that the dead weight loss associated with ineﬃcient eﬀort allocation
among existing teachers is a ﬁrst order concern as well, regardles of whether or
not one contends that many existing teachers should not be allowed to continue
teaching.
2 Moral Hazard
The literature on the use of assessment based incentive schemes in education
often draws a distinction between accountability systems and performance pay
systems. Assessment-based accountability systems are promoted as vehicles for
holding public schools accountable for their use of public funds. These systems
deﬁne achievement standards for students and then measure the performance
of schools using metrics that describe the degree of discrepancy between the
standards set by the accountability systems and the achievement of the student
populations in various schools. Further, these systems often also include a set
of sanctions that school administrators and teachers face if their students fail
to meet the performance targets set by the accountability system.
In sum, accountability systems typically seek to accomplish two tasks. They
attempt to measure the performance of schools relative to a set of public stan-
dards in a manner that is consistent over schools and over time. Further, they
create incentives for educators to provide eﬀective instruction for their students.
Thus, the paradigm that dominates accountability system design involves a two-
step procedure. First, measure performance relative to public standards. Then,
reward or punish schools based on success or failure to meet these standards.
Because accountability systems typically contain rewards and sanctions that
are either not spelled out in detail or less than credible because they cannot
be enforced ex post,13 the primary function of most accountability systems
is performance measurement. In contrast, performance pay systems are more
explicitly focused on incentive provision and often contain precise mappings
between the performance of students and the compensation and employment
status of educators.
In this chapter, I focus most of my attention on performance pay systems
for several reasons. To begin, the purpose of this chapter is to explore theory
and evidence concerning the design of incentive systems for educators, and per-
formance pay systems are explicit incentive schemes. Further, one of my main
conclusions will be that accountability systems always create predictable eﬀort
distortions when employed as incentive systems. Systems that serve as mecha-
13One of the most infamous examples of a system that contains incredible threats of sanc-
tions is the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). Neal (2010) provides a discussion
of how the school re-organization threats attached to the 100% proﬁciency requirement cre-
ate confusion concerning how the law will be enforced in future years when this requirement
becomes binding and tens of thousands of schools have failed to meet it.
9nisms for providing public information about the achievement of students and
the performance of schools relative to public education standards distort eﬀort
if they contain rewards or sanctions that provide incentives for educators.
Donald Campbell (1976) oﬀered the following summary of common patterns
he observed in case studies of the use of performance metrics for incentive pro-
vision in government agencies,
“I come to the following pessimistic laws (at least for the U.S.
scene): The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social
decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures
and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes
it is intended to monitor.” Campbell, (1976)
A key component of social decision making in Campbell’s analyses is resource al-
location among government workers or their units. Thus, one way to understand
Campbell’s Law is that, when government tries to pursue two missions, e.g. in-
centive provision and performance measurement, with one system, it fails at
both missions. Campbell oﬀered this observation as an empirical law. I will use
a simple model of worker responses to incentive schemes to explain why Camp-
bell observed what he observed. In section 2.7, I will discuss how education
oﬃcials can improve both performance measurement and incentive provision by
developing separate systems that address these goals independently.
2.1 A Simple Treatment of the Multi-Tasking Problem
The multi-tasking model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) is the tool that
economists most often employ to organize their thoughts about the responses
of teachers to various merit pay schemes. Here, I use a special case of their
model to build intuition concerning the forces that shape the optimal design of
incentives in education.14
Consider an education authority that hires one teacher to teach one student.
The teacher allocates her eﬀort among two diﬀerent tasks. Let t1 be the time
that the teacher devotes to task one, and let t2 denote the time she devotes to
task two. The human capital production technology is such that
h = f1t1 + f2t2 + e
where (h   e) is the human capital acquired by the student as a result of
the teacher’s eﬀorts. Here, h is an addition to the value of a skill set, and
it is measured in dollars. f1 and f2 are constants, and e is a random shock
to the learning process that captures factors beyond the teacher’s control that
aﬀect the student’s rate of learning. The authority cannot observe h, t1, or t2.
However, the authority can observe a statistical measure of teacher performance,
p; where
14Here, I follow the Gibbons (2010) exposition of the model. See Baker (2002) for a related
treatment.
10p = g1t1 + g2t2 + v
g1 and g2 are constants, and v is a random shock that inﬂuences measured
performance. Here, we assume that both e and v are shocks drawn indepen-
dently from distributions with mean zero that do not depend on the actions of
the teacher, (t1;t2). We also assume that the teacher’s utility function can be
described by
U = X   C(t1;t2)
where X is the teacher’s expected income and C(t1;t2) describes the teacher’s
cost of eﬀort for any pair (t1;t2). Now, suppose the education authority seeks
to design an optimal compensation contract of the form
w = s + bp
where s is a base salary, and b is a bonus rate associated with the performance
measure p. The base salary s is not interesting for our purposes because it is
only a mechanism for dividing surplus between the teacher and the authority.
Given any choice of b, one can choose a base salary large enough to elicit the
teacher’s participation given some outside utility option U0.
The optimal bonus rate b is the solution to the following problem:
max
b
f1t1(b) + f2t2(b)   C(t1(b);t2(b)) s:t:
[t1(b);t2(b)] = argmax
t1;t2
s + b(g1t1 + g2t2)   C(t1;t2)
In words, the optimal bonus rate maximizes the diﬀerence between the ex-
pected value of the human capital created by the teacher’s action and the cost
of the teacher’s actions taking into account that the teacher’s response to any
bonus rate, b, will be to chose actions that maximize her utility given b. Assume
the following cost function for teacher eﬀort,
C(t1;t2) = :5(t1    t1)2 + :5(t2)2
where  t1 is a norm for time devoted to eﬀective instruction. The educa-
tion authority may have established this norm through previous expenditures
devoted to screening potential teachers or professional development activities.
The key is that, for the purposes of this analysis, the norm is ﬁxed and not
aﬀected by the incentive scheme. The education authority chooses the optimal
incentive structure taking  t1 as given.











where  is the angle between the vectors (f1;f2) and (g1;g2): See Figure 1.15
coeff. 









 Figure 1  
By assuming that workers and ﬁrms are risk neutral and that costs are
quadratic, I have made sure that the formula for b is simple. Nonetheless, this
15The points [(0;0);(f1;f2);(g1;g2)] form a triangle that can be split into two right triangles.
Based on the right triangle that includes the origin, it is easy to show that cos =
f1g1+f2g2
jjfjj jjgjj
12formula highlights two factors that shape the optimal strength of incentives in
more general settings. To begin, cos is an alignment factor. If the vectors are
orthogonal, e.g. (f1 = 0;f2 > 0) and (g1 > 0;g2 = 0), then cos = cos 90 = 0,
and b = 0. If the performance measure is aligned perfectly with true output,
the two vectors fall on the same ray from the origin, cos = cos 0 = 1. The
ratio preceding cos is a scale factor. Note that when the performance metric is
perfectly aligned, the ratio of the two vector lengths simply transforms the units
of the performance metric into dollars, i.e. the monetary value of the human
capital created by the teacher’s actions.
2.2 Is Incentive Pay Eﬃcient in Education?
I return speciﬁcally to the topics of alignment and scale below, but I ﬁrst want
to discuss what this model teaches concerning whether or not the presence of
at least some form of incentive pay is optimal, i.e. b > 0. This version of the
multi-tasking model implies that positive incentives are optimal, b > 0, as long
as f1g1 + f2g2 6= 0. To see this, note that in cases where b < 0, the authority
can always implement b > 0 by deﬁning a new performance metric p0 =  p.
The condition, f1g1 + f2g2 > 0, always holds if at least three of the four
constants, (f1;f2;g1;g2), are strictly positive and none are negative, i.e. if
one task contributes to both output and the performance measure, the other
task contributes to one or both, and neither task is detrimental to either real
output or the performance measure, then some positive level of incentive pay
is optimal. Deﬁne t1 as time spent teaching the curriculum using teaching
techniques deemed to be best practice, and then note that t2 may be given
many diﬀerent labels, e.g. coaching students regarding test taking strategies,
changing student answers before assessments are graded, etc. Most discussions
of educators’ responses to high-stakes testing regimes implicitly assume that
f1 > 0;g1 > 0;g2 > 0, and thus, if the gaming activities, t2, do not harm
students, f2  0, then optimal policy in this framework must involve some
positive level of performance pay, b > 0.
On its surface, the condition f2  0 seems like a fairly weak requirement,
and thus the formula for b above seems to indicate that some positive level
of incentive pay is always eﬃcient. However, this feature of b is not a robust
feature of the multi-tasking model because it hinges on separability in the cost
function.
Since education requires both teacher and student time and since students
have ﬁnite energy and attention, cost functions of the following form may be
just as interesting to consider:
C(t1;t2) = :5(t1 + t2    t)2
Here, t1 and t2 are perfect substitutes, and  t is a norm for total eﬀort that
inﬂuences teacher costs. I assume that in the absence of any incentive pay,
13teachers choose t1 =  t and t2 = 0.16 Given this setting, if the education author-
ity chooses b > 0, then teachers choose t1 = 0 as long as g2 > g1 and there are
many combinations of f1, f2, g2, and  t such that the authority should optimally
choose to have no incentive pay and accept f1 t as classroom output. When
f1 > f2 and f1 t represents baseline output, any incentive scheme that causes
teachers to substitute small amounts of t2 for t1 lowers output while holding
costs constant.
Nonetheless, if  t is low enough, incentive pay may still increase total surplus.
Since t1 cannot be negative, the global beneﬁts of increasing t2 well beyond  t
may compensate for the loss of t1 =  t. Thus, whether or not b = 0; hinges on
the technology of classroom instruction and the norm,  t, that exists in a school
system.
A key consideration in the literature on responses to incentive schemes in ed-
ucation has been the precise nature of the activities, t2, induced by the incentive
scheme and the relative values of f2 and g2 given the maintained assumption
that g2 > g1. However, it is equally important to consider whether or not t2
actions represent an increase in total teacher eﬀort or simply substitution away
from t1. In the latter scenario, eﬀort norms and the nature of teacher cost func-
tions are key. Schemes that induce teachers to devote more eﬀort to coaching
and test preparation may improve overall performance among teachers who were
devoting little time to eﬀective teaching ex ante. However, these same schemes
are harmful when they induce eﬀective teachers to replace eﬀective instruction
with signiﬁcant amounts of coaching.
Now that I have presented a basic model that can serve as a guide to inter-
preting empirical results on incentive schemes in education, I draw your atten-
tion to Table 1. This table contains a summary of pay for performance schemes
that are either on-going or have been implemented in the recent past. The ta-
ble devotes particular attention to schemes that have been evaluated by teams
of independent scholars, and it covers performance pay schemes from several
diﬀerent countries. Most of these studies address schemes implemented in the
developed world, but a few address performance pay in developing countries. As
I work through various implications of agency theory for the design of incentive
schemes, I will refer back to related empirical results in Table 1.
2.3 Generalizability
Table 1 shows that many assessment-based performance pay schemes do gener-
ate noteworthy increases in student performance on the particular assessment
used for incentive provision. Thus, Table 1 provides much evidence against the
notion that educators simply do not respond to incentives. The exceptions are
the PRP system in England, the recent pay scale reform in Portugal, two recent
experiments in New York City and Tennessee. I will comment below concerning
the unique features of these schemes that may have muted incentives.
16Teachers are indiﬀerent among any combinations (t1;t2) such that t1 + t2 =  t, but here I
assume that they use the students’ best interests as a tie breaker.
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5-stage career ladder for teachers 
that awarded bonuses after 
reaching the third stage. Bonuses 
ranged from $1000 for the third 
certification level to $7000 for the 
fifth certification level. 
Dee and Keys 
(2004)
Math scores increased by 3%, 
reading scores by 2%, but only 
increases in math were 
statistically significant. 
Teachers on the lower 3 rungs 
were more effective at 
promoting math achievement, 
and teachers at the higher 




School based program that 
awarded bonuses to schools for 
either being the top scoring school 
or for showing the most 
improvement. Bonuses were 
divided equally among all  
teachers in a school who were 




The program increased 
government exam participation. 
It did not increase scores in the 
first year, but treatment scores 
rose by .14 SDs relative to 
controls in the second year.   
However, this improvement did 
not persist after the completion 
of the program, and there were 
no improvements on parallel 
low stakes NGO exams. 
ABC North Carolina
1996-
School based program that awards 
bonuses to all teachers if school 
wide scores meet statistical 
target.  $1,500 maximum bonus. 
Part of the state accountability 
system.
Vigdor (2009) Large Gains in Math and 
Reading Proficiency on the 
State Test.  NAEP trends 
suggest that reading gains are 
suspect, but  math gains may 
reflect real improvement.
TABLE 1 -  EXISTING EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEMS AND THEIR EFFECTSDSAIP Dallas, 
1991-1995
Schools were ranked based on 
gains in student learning. 
Approximately the top 20% of 
schools received awards for each 
member of their staff. Principals 
and teachers received $1000 
bonuses, and other staff received 
$500.
Ladd (1999) Pass rates on standardized 
tests of Reading and Math 
increased significantly, but only 
for white and Hispanic 
students. Black students did 
not exhibit significant gains 
relative to other cities. The 
dropout rate decreased more in 
Dallas relative to other cities 
from 1991 to 1994.
KIRIS Kentucky, 
1992-1996
Schools could earn bonus money if 
they achieved growth targets for 
school wide performance on 





Scores on KIRIS assessments 
rose dramatically in all 
subjects, but Kentucky students 
showed modest gains or no 
improvement on many 






Schools were ranked based on 
their relative performance 
adjusted for student background 
characteristics. Credits hours, 
matriculation exam pass rates, 
and dropout rates served as 
performance criteria.  The top 1/3 
of schools received awards. 75% 
of the award went to bonuses for 
teachers,  25% of the award went 
to  facilities improvements. 
Lavy (2002) Clear evidence of improved 
outcomes on most dimensions 
with larger impacts observed in 
religious schools.  Matriculation 
certificates did not increase in 
secular schools, but average 
test scores increased in both 
secular and religious schools. 
PRP  England
1999-
Teachers submit applications for 
bonus pay and provide 
documentation of better than 
average performance in promoting 
student achievement. Teachers 
who are promoted become eligible 
for future raises if they meet 
documented criteria.
Atkinson et al. 
(2009)
No clear evidence of 
improvement.  Given one 
strategy that sought to adjust 
for experience differences 
between treatment and 
controls, English and Science 
teachers showed modest 
improvement.  Math teachers 
did not show improvement.




Statistical VAM method produces 
teacher performance indices of 1 
to 5.  Teachers with scores of 3 or 
greater earn a bonus that 
increases with their score.
Hudson (2010) Introduction of TAP raises math 
achievement relative to 
samples in a synthetic control 
group by .15 SDs.  Reading 






A rank order tournament among 
teachers of each subject, with 
fixed rewards of several levels. 
Teachers were ranked based on 
how many students passed the 
matriculation exam, as well as the 
average scores of their students.
Lavy (2009) There were overall 
improvements in pass rates in 
Math and English due to an 
overall change in teaching 
methods, increased after school 
teaching, and increased 
responsiveness to student 
needs among teachers. 
Increased exam participation 









100 schools got group bonuses 
based on school performance, and 
100 got individual bonuses based 
on teacher performance. Bonuses 
were awarded based on how much 
the percentage gain in average 





After 2 years, students in 
incentive schools scored better 
than the control group by .28 
SDs in math, and .17 SDs in 
language. These students also 
tended to do better on 
questions of all difficulty. 
Students at incentive schools 









Individual teachers were awarded 
bonuses based on their students’ 
improvement on the Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills. Awards were 
determined by the level of growth 
and number of students a teacher 
had.
Winters et al. 
(2008) 
There was statistically 
significant improvement in all 
three subjects (math, reading, 
language) tested. Students 
increased 3.5 Normal Curve 
Equivalent (NCE) points in math 
(.16 SDs), 3.3 NCE points in 
reading (.15 SDs), and 4.6 NCE 
points in language (.22 SDs).
TABLE 1 -  EXISTING EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEMS AND THEIR EFFECTSPOINT Nashville,TN
2006-2009
Teachers volunteered to 
participate in a performance pay 
experiment.  Bonuses of 5K, 10K, 
and 15K were awarded for 
surpassing the 80%, 90%, and 95% 
threshold in the historic 
distribution of value-added.
Springer et al 
(2010)
Program involved 5th through 
8th grade math teachers.  Some 
evidence of achievement gains 
in 5th grade math in years two 
and three, but these gains did 
not persist over the next school 
year. No evidence of positive 
program impacts in other 
grades. Attrition rates from the 
study were high years two and 







Random sample of “high need” 
schools participated in a bonus 
pay scheme.  The scheme involved 
team incentive pay at the school 
level linked to growth targets, but 
school compensation committees 
distributed the bonus money 
among teachers.  The two bonus 
levels were $3,000 per teacher and 
$1,500 per teacher.  The program 
was added on top of an 
accountability program that 




Performance scores were 
weighted averages  of 
improvements in test score 
performance and inspections of 
school environment.  Targets 
scores required lower 
performing schools to make 
greater improvements.  2008-09 
was the only full year of 
implementation.  89% of eligible 
schools won the maximum 
bonus.  There is no clear 







Abandoned single pay scale in 
favor of two scale system.  
Promotion to higher pay scale  
involved a level jump of about 25% 
of monthly salary.  Teachers in the 
same school who already worked 
on the higher pay scale performed 
the performance assessments for 
junior teachers.
Martins (2009) Using schools in the Azores and 
Madeira as well as private 
schools as controls, there is no 
evidence of achievement gains 
induced by the program and 
consistent evidence that the 
program harmed achievement 
on national exams.
TABLE 1 -  EXISTING EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEMS AND THEIR EFFECTSMAP Florida Districts choose their own method 






Teachers and principals negotiate 
achievement targets for individual 
students. Teachers can also earn 
bonuses for meeting state growth 
expectations for their students 
based on statistical targets.  
Finally, teachers may earn 
bonuses for serving in a 
“distinguished” school.  School 
ratings are determined by tests 
scores, parent surveys, and 
attendance.  Maximum 





Minnesota Much of performance pay linked to 
evaluations of lesson plans and 
their implementation. Schools or 
districts develop their own plans 
for measuring teacher 




TABLE 1 -  EXISTING EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE PAY SYSTEMS AND THEIR EFFECTSI begin my review of the empirical studies in Table 1 by asking how many
studies provide evidence that a particular incentive scheme induced changes
in teacher eﬀort allocations that improved results on a particular assessment
but did not improve students’ actual skill levels. In the framework set out
above, it seems natural to assume that, given most interpretations of t2, f1 >
0; f2  0; g1  0; g2 > 0, and this implies that any incentive scheme with
b > 0 will induce teachers to supply more total eﬀort t1 + t2 >  t, since the
marginal costs of both eﬀorts are zero given t1 + t2 =  t. However, the choice of
b > 0 is clearly not welfare improving if the increased total eﬀort by teachers
improves measured performance, p, without generating improvements in actual
student human capital, h. This combination of outcomes implies that teachers
are expending more eﬀort in response to the incentive scheme without improving
student learning, which suggests that improvements in measured performance
are coming through increases in t2 that crowd out time devoted to t1 and result
in lower student human capital.
If the ex post evaluation of a given incentive scheme reveals that student
learning did improve, this is not clear evidence that the introduction of the
scheme improved welfare. Such a ﬁnding constitutes evidence that the scheme
created real beneﬁts for students, but these beneﬁts may or may not be greater
than the costs of the program. These costs include not only the resources
required to implement the program but also any losses of student skill in areas
that are not assessed and therefore given less attention after such schemes are
implemented.
On the other hand, if studies that evaluate the eﬀects of a given incentive
plan reveal no real improvements in student skill, then there is good reason to
suspect that the plan is not eﬃcient. Implementing incentive schemes usually
requires new resources, and schemes that do not generate real improvements
in student skills that are the targets of assessments are not likely sources of
improvements in skills that are not directly assessed.
Empirical research on these questions is fundamentally diﬃcult because nei-
ther policy makers or researchers observe true skill, h. Nonetheless, a signiﬁcant
body of research on high-stakes testing systems attempts to make inferences
about changes in h by exploring whether or not assessment gains induced by
particular incentive systems generalize to other assessments. For example, as-
sume that a school district decides to implement a performance pay system for
ﬁfth grade math teachers, and the district links teacher pay to student results
on assessment A. Further, assume that following the introduction of this pro-
gram, student results on assessment A improve. The generalizability question
that interests many researchers in educational statistics involves the following
counter factual,
“Suppose that in every period, the ﬁfth grade students in this
district had also taken a second math assessment, B, and teachers
were not rewarded or punished as a result of student outcomes on
assessment B. Would one have observed gains on assessment B fol-
lowing the introduction of incentive pay that were comparable to the
15gains observed on assessment A?”
In sum, do gains measured on the assessments used to determine incentive
payments reﬂect increases in skill that create general improvements in math
assessment results or only improvements speciﬁc to one assessment format or a
particular set of questions?
If gains on a particular high-stakes assessment do not generalize, this is
not clear evidence that the incentive system induced no changes in teacher
behavior that created real increases in skill. Assessments diﬀer in terms of their
relative focus on various topics and assessment B may simply not cover the
skills assessed on A that improved. Nonetheless, if one ﬁnds that gains on a
particular high-stakes assessment do not generalize at all to other assessments
that are designed to cover the same curriculum, it is possible that the gains on
the high-stakes assessment represent no lasting contributions to student skill.
In this case, the district likely induced socially wasteful allocations of teacher
eﬀort that improved high-stakes assessment results without improving student
skills.
Koretz (2002) summarizes results from several studies of generalizability,
and he discusses three diﬀerent types of teacher behavior that could generate
gains on high-stakes tests that do not generalize to other assessments of the
same subject matter. To begin, teachers may narrow their instructional focus.
If teachers respond to incentives by devoting more class time to topics listed in
the curriculum and stressed on a related high-stakes assessments, then scores
on these assessments may rise substantially while scores on broader assessments
of the same subject may show only modest improvements. This scenario is a
plausible explanation for the results found in some generalizability studies, but
it seems far fetched as an explanation for why some studies document large
improvements on high-stakes assessments while scores on contemporaneous low
stakes assessments of the same domain remain ﬂat or even fall.
Here, it seems more likely that teachers are engaging in what Koretz calls
coaching. Coaching involves activities that improve scores on a given assess-
ment without improving student mastery of a subject. Stecher (2002) reviews
observational studies of coaching behaviors and cites a striking example of such
behavior in two Arizona school districts that introduced high-stakes assessment
systems. Shephard and Dougherty (1991) report that teachers in these districts
reduced the number of writing assignments they gave to students and increased
the number of assignments that involved having students ﬁnd mistakes in pre-
pared passages. This change in teaching practice likely harmed the development
of writing skill among students, but it makes sense as a strategy for raising test
scores on standardized tests.17
Koretz also noted that some educator responses to high-stakes assessment
systems go beyond coaching and constitute cheating. I discuss speciﬁc examples
of cheating in the next section, but for now, I note that both coaching and
17Stecher (2002) reviews several related practices that have been documented in other states.
In math, a related practice involves working only on math problems that follow a format or
rubric know to be present on a particular high-stakes assessment.
16cheating should generate measured achievement gains that do not generalize to
other assessments.
Clean evidence on the generalizability of assessment gains is rare, and the
existing literature does not speak with one voice. Some studies provide fairly
persuasive evidence that the measured gains induced by a particular perfor-
mance pay program represented little or no improvement in actual subject mas-
tery. Others provide suggestive evidence that at least a portion of the measured
gains induced by particular programs reﬂects real skill gains.
I begin by considering two programs in Table 1 that both involve perfor-
mance pay that is determined by assessments results collected within state ac-
countability programs. The ABC program in North Carolina allows all teachers
in a given school to earn a bonus of up to $1,500 per teacher based on the test
score performance of all the students in the school relative to targets deter-
mined by a statistical model that conditions on historical performance in the
particular school in question and in the state as a whole. The KIRIS system
in Kentucky began in 1992. This system also provided bonus pay for teachers
based on team performance. All teachers in a school could earn bonuses if the
overall performance of students in their school surpassed targets determined by
KIRIS formulas.
Koretz and Barron (1998) examine the eﬀects of KIRIS on achievement dur-
ing the period 1992-96. Vigdor (2009) examines the eﬀects on ABC of student
achievement in North Carolina. Both studies compare trends in NAEP scores
with trends in scores on the state speciﬁc assessments used to create school
accountability measures and determine bonus payments. Koretz and Barron
(1998) report results in standard deviation units. Vigdor (2009) reports trends
in proﬁciency rates. These studies provide evidence that KIRIS and ABC pro-
duced noteworthy gains in reading and math scores on state assessments. Fur-
ther, in some subjects and grades, the improvements on the KIRIS exams were
extremely large.
Nonetheless, NAEP scores in Kentucky improved by only modest amounts
and at rates no greater than one would have expected based on national trends,
and reading proﬁciency rates in North Carolina follow a similar pattern. In
fact, eighth grade reading proﬁciency levels on NAEP in North Carolina have
been lower than for most of the past decade than they were in the late 1990s
when the state introduced the ABC system. Still, since the introduction of ABC,
proﬁciency rates in math on both the state assessment and the NAEP have risen
steadily, and although Vigdor does not compare North Carolina NAEP trends
in math with trends in other states, the math results from ABC are at least
consistent with the hypothesis that ABC generated gains in math achievement
that are not entirely speciﬁc to the ABC assessment system.
The ABC and KIRIS programs are of particular interest here because they
involved cash payments to educators and independent researchers have explored
the generalizability of the gains induced by these systems. However, there is a
larger literature on the generalizability of gains induced by high-stakes account-
ability systems generally. Jacob (2005) concludes that an accountability system
introduced in the Chicago Public Schools in 1996 generated noteworthy gains
17in scores on high-stakes assessments, but he reports that scores on low stakes
assessments did not improve among third and sixth grade students relative to
what one would have expected based on pre-existing trends in Chicago test
scores. Jacob ﬁnds that both high and low stakes scores rose sharply among
eighth graders, and he concludes that the Chicago accountability program gen-
erated increases in general skills among older students but not among younger
students.
Klein et al (2000) examine data from Texas during the 1990s. The Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills (TASS) program began in the 1990s, and this
accountability program received considerable attention because scores on TASS
exams rose dramatically following the introduction of state wide accountabil-
ity measures. However, Klein et al demonstrate that, between 1992 and 1996,
changes in NAEP reading and math tests did not always square with corre-
sponding changes in TASS scores. Fourth grade math scores on the NAEP rose
sharply in Texas relative to scores in other states, but changes in NAEP fourth
grade reading scores and changes in NAEP eighth grade math scores in Texas
followed the same pattern in Texas that one observes nationwide.
Hanushek and Raymond (2005) analyze diﬀerences among states in NAEP
scores trends during the 1990s and conclude that accountability systems improve
student learning if they contain real threats of sanctions for educators when
students perform poorly. They reach this conclusion by comparing the time
pattern of state level changes in NAEP scores with the timing of the introduction
of state level accountability systems of diﬀerent types. They conclude that
accountability systems that only create public report cards for schools generate
at most small gains in achievement but systems that contain real sanctions for
poor educator performance generate noteworthy gains in NAEP scores.
In 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) forced all states to adopt
accountability systems that contained at the least threats of serious sanctions
for poorly performing schools. Because NCLB is a nationwide program, it is
nearly impossible to precisely assess its impact on general skill development,
but it is clear that measured achievement gains on most state assessments have
greatly exceeded gains on the NAEP since 2001.
In sum, the United States literature suggests that assessment based incen-
tives schemes typically generate measured improvements on the assessments
used to determine rewards and sanctions for educators, and in some cases but
not all, these gains appear to reﬂect improvements in general student skills.
Readers may be less than surprised to learn that results from generalizability
studies outside the United States also provide mixed results.
Glewwe (2009) argues that agency problems between public school teachers
and education authorities are often much more severe in developing countries
than in the developed world. In many developing countries, teachers earn wages
that are many times greater than per capita GDP, yet teachers are often ab-
sent from school and often absent from their classrooms even when they attend
school. He summarizes evidence from a number of developing countries and
makes a compelling case that public school teachers in many developing coun-
tries perform poorly while earning large wage rents.
18Given these stylized facts, policy makers and researchers are interested in
learning more about the potential beneﬁts of performance pay schemes for ed-
ucators in less developed countries. Two recent studies employ data from ﬁeld
experiments in Kenya and India. These settings are interesting because, in
both countries, teachers earn much more than the typical worker and also work
within civil service systems that provide extraordinary job security and few
performance pressures. The high wages oﬀered to teachers in these countries
permit both governments to ﬁll teaching positions with well educated people,
but the civil service systems in both countries create widespread concern about
teacher eﬀort. As in many other developing countries, absenteeism is a signiﬁ-
cant problem, and policy makers have concerns about the eﬀort level of teachers
who do show up for work. Given the status quo in both countries, some may
conjecture that the introduction of incentive pay should create real beneﬁts in
both countries. However, the results from these experiments are quite mixed.
Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010) evaluate an incentive pay program run
as an experiment in Kenya by International Child Support (ICS).18 The pro-
gram began by selecting 100 schools that appeared to be performing less than
optimally. From these schools, the program administrators chose 50 schools to
participate in a program that awarded prizes to teachers based on student test
score performance in their schools. The plan involved team incentives since
all teachers who worked with students in grades 4 through 8 received common
prizes based on an aggregate measure of the performance of all of their students.
The prizes ranged in value from 21 to 43 percent of the monthly earnings
of a typical teacher. Students took two types of exams. The program linked
teacher prizes to scores on government exams, but ICS also created another set
of exams that involved no stakes for teachers. The program generated little
evidence of test score improvements during the ﬁrst year or the program. In the
second year, the program created large score gains on government tests but no
improvements in scores on the low stakes exams.
Glewwe et al conclude that teachers responded to the program by increasing
the number of test preparation sessions held for students. They ﬁnd no evidence
of improvements in teacher attendance or classroom practice. Further, they
report that even the improvements on government exams did not persist in year
three after the incentive program ended.
The fact that the ICS experiment generated measured improvements in stu-
dent achievement that did not generalize to a parallel low stakes assessment is
not shocking given the results reviewed above. However, it is noteworthy that
relative student performance on high-stakes exams returned to pre-program lev-
els when the incentive experiment ended. Thus, the test preparation sessions
and other activities that generated the measured improvements in high-stakes
test performance during the program did not even generate lasting improve-
ments in test taking skills or knowledge speciﬁc to the government exams.
While the Glewwe et al results provide suggestive evidence that the Kenyan
18ICS is a Dutch organization that funds education and health interventions that seek to
help children in developing countries.
19program was socially wasteful, a recent incentive pay program in India appears
to have generated some real gains for students. The Andhra Pradesh Random-
ized Evaluation Study (APRES) is a large study of experimental interventions
in government primary schools located in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.
School years begin in the middle of June in Andhra Pradesh, and the program
began in late June of 2005 with baseline testing of students in treatment and
control schools. Two of the treatments speciﬁed in this project involved bonus
pay schemes based on student test score outcomes in future years.
Let  s equal the percentage point increase in the average score of the stu-
dents in a given classroom or school. Teachers received bonus pay equal to
500  max[0; s   5]. Teachers who participated in the group incentive plan
received bonuses based on school-level average improvements, so, if the average
score in a team-incentive school increased by .07, all teachers received a bonus
of 1,000 rupees. Teachers in the individual incentive program received bonuses
according to the same forumla based on the performance of their own students.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010) estimate the impacts of these two
incentive programs by comparing test score outcomes in treatment schools over
the subsequent two years to outcomes in a group of control schools. The APRES
design randomly assigned 100 schools to each of the two treatments and the
control sample. Both incentive programs generated signiﬁcant improvements in
student tests scores. Taken as a whole, the incentive programs raised scores
over a two-year period relative to the control group by .27 standard deviations
in math and .17 standard deviations in language. The measured impacts in
year two are somewhat larger in schools treated with the individual incentive
program.
The APRES experiment did not collect test score data from any parallel set
of low-stakes math and reading exams. Thus, it is not possible to perform a
direct analysis of the generalizability of these gains. However, Muralidharan and
Sundararaman provide much suggestive evidence that these gains do reﬂect at
least some real contributions to student subject mastery. Scores on social studies
and science tests also rose signiﬁcantly in incentive schools relative to control
schools even though teachers received bonus pay based only on the math and
language results. Further, there is evidence that teachers in incentive schools
assigned more work and conducted classes beyond regular school hours. On
the other hand, there is evidence that part of the extra class time was devoted
to taking practice tests, which may have involved some coaching behaviors.
Further, there is no evidence that teachers in incentive schools improved their
attendance rates, which remained far below levels found in developed countries.
The contrast between the results from Kenya and India points to the need
for more research on what features of the design and implementation of incentive
programs improve outcomes. One obvious diﬀerence between the two programs
is that the Kenyan program tied reward pay to results on national examinations
that had been in place for a long time while the APRES experiment developed
their own exams for the program. The greater apparent prevalence of coaching
as opposed to improved teaching in Kenya may signal that familiarity with
the national exam system greatly raised the relative returns to coaching. This
20conjecture is quite speculative at this point, but I argue below that coaching
is less of a concern if education authorities implement assessment systems such
that the speciﬁc item content and format of each assessment is not predictable.
2.4 Other Hidden Actions and the Contamination of In-
formation
In the previous section, I discussed implicit and explicit evidence that teachers
coach students for speciﬁc exam questions and question formats in response to
high-stakes assessments. Although coaching is typically not an optimal alloca-
tion of teacher eﬀort, some forms of coaching may generate some lasting human
capital gains for students, and if coaching activities reﬂect reduced leisure on the
part of teachers rather than reductions in eﬀective teaching time, it is possible
that these incentive schemes are improving educator performance relative to the
performance one expects given public sector monitoring alone. Nonetheless, a
diﬀerent literature documents other ways that some teachers respond to assess-
ment based incentive schemes that are almost certainly wasteful from a social
perspective. In Koretz’s (2002) taxonomy, these activities constitute cheating.
Jacob and Levitt (2003) provide clear and compelling evidence that some
teachers or principals in Chicago responded to the introduction of high-stakes
accountability in 1996 by simply changing their students’ answer sheets before
returning them. It is worth noting that these cheaters were not terribly sophis-
ticated. Jacob and Levitt found that some classes got entire blocks of questions
correct even though their performance on the remaining questions implies that
it should have been almost impossible for the whole class to get any one set of
even two or three questions correct. The scores for students linked with cheating
often reﬂect large increases from the previous year, and these same students ex-
perience small improvements or declines in the following year. Jacob and Levitt
conclude that cheating took place in between three and ﬁve percent of Chicago
classrooms following the introduction of high-stakes testing.
Figlio and Winicki (2005) present evidence that schools in Virginia that
faced the most serious threats of sanctions under a state accountability system
responded by increasing the sugar content of student meals on the day the state
administered high-stakes tests. They also cite several media reports of similar
behavior in response to high-stakes assessment systems in other areas of the
country. School oﬃcials appear to be responding to a literature that links test
score performance to glucose level in test takers, and these actions represent a
textbook example of how agents may respond to the presence of an incentive
system by taking hidden actions that inﬂate their measured performance but
contribute nothing to their actual performance.
Jacob and Levitt (2003) and Figlio and Winicki (2005) show that high-
stakes assessment systems induce some educators to engage in behaviors that
are socially wasteful. These socially wasteful behaviors as well as the coaching
activities described above contaminate public information about school perfor-
mance in two ways. First, since these types of manipulations inﬂate assessment
results, these behaviors contaminate measures of how student achievement is
21evolving over time on average in a state, district, or school. Second, because
some educators are likely more prone to engage in these manipulations than
others, these manipulations also distort our understanding of the relative per-
formance of diﬀerent districts, schools, and teachers. This second point is often
missed in current policy debates. The case studies that Campbell (1976) re-
viewed involve scenarios in which gaming behaviors contaminate information
about the performance of some unit or agency over time. However, if the teach-
ers and principals in various schools diﬀer in their personal norms concerning
their distaste for coaching or cheating behaviors, then heterogeneity in coaching
or cheating contaminates the information that assessments provide concerning
relative performance levels in a cross-section of teachers or schools at a point in
time.
Suppose school A has higher measured performance than school B under a
low stakes assessment regime, but the measured performance of school B exceeds
that of school A after the introduction of a high-stakes assessment program.
There are two possibilities. School B may have instituted real improvements and
now is more eﬀective than school A, or the staﬀ of school B may simply be more
willing than the staﬀ of school A to engage in coaching or cheating behaviors
that inﬂate measured performance. This last possibility may be thought of
as Campbell’s Law turned on its side because it points to the possibility that
hidden responses to incentive schemes may contaminate not only time-series
information concerning the true evolution of average performance but also cross-
sectional information about the true relative performance of various units at a
point in time.
Some policy makers may have their own preferred strategies for minimizing
cheating or coaching through the use of independent testing agencies or other
devices. However, if the assessment system used to measure student performance
or educator performance relative to public standards is a no stakes system that
is completely separate from any system of incentives or sanctions for educators,
there is no reason for educators to engage in coaching or cheating in the ﬁrst
place. Any assessment-based performance pay system must contain strategies
for minimizing gaming behaviors, but the best strategy for making sure that
public measurement systems actually produce reliable measurements is to make
these systems separate from any systems that reward or punish educators.19
2.5 Choosing Targets and Prizes
In section 2.1 above, I presented a model where the education authority takes
the performance metric as given and must choose an optimal linear piece-rate
given this performance metric. Most assessment based incentive programs in
education do not resemble piece rate schemes where educators earn bonus pay
as a linear function of some scaled performance metric. Instead, most incentive
programs for educators are contest schemes, and more often than not, these
19Cullen and Reback (2006) show that schools may also alter the results of assessment-based
accountability systems by manipulating the distribution of students who are tested.
22contests do not involve competition among educators but rather competition to
surpass a performance target.
In section 2.1, I described a human capital production function in which
teacher actions are the only source of growth in human capital or increase in
measured performance, and I used this model to discuss the alignment of incen-
tive schemes when teachers can take multiple hidden actions. Now, I want to set
aside the issue of alignment and focus on the choice of performance targets and
prizes given a well aligned performance metric. The existing literature contains
little discussion of these issues. The papers summarized in Table 1 contain no
formal analyses of how to set performance targets for contests or prizes given
certain performance targets in order to maximize some clearly deﬁned social
objective function.
I assume that teachers can engage in only one action, t, which one can
think of as time spent employing optimal teaching practices. Further, because
I am concerned with how the authority sets performance targets, I also model
changes in student human capital and measured academic performance that do
not result from teacher eﬀort but rather from baseline learning that reﬂects
activities directed by a student’s parents or the student himself.
For now, I continue to assume that each teacher teaches one student and
specify the model as follows:
h = (h0) + ft + e
p = '(h0) + gt + v
U = X  
c
2
(t    t)2
Here, as in section 2.1, h is the human capital the student possesses at the
end of the period, and p is the measured performance of the student at the end of
the period. But now, the educational production function includes (h0), which
captures baseline learning that is not attributed to teacher eﬀort, and '(h0),
which captures the eﬀect of baseline learning on measured achievement. Both of
these baseline learning factors are functions of the student’s human capital stock
at the beginning of the period, h0. The parameters f and g capture the eﬀects of
t on human capital growth and changes in measured performance respectively.
The terms e and v are mean zero error terms that reﬂect shocks to the creation
and measurement of human capital. Both are drawn identically and indepen-
dently over all student-teacher pairs, and both distributions are unimodal and
symmetric around zero. Let (:) denote the cumulative distribution function of
v: Realizations of v determine the outcomes of contests in equilibrium.
As before, U is teacher utility and X denotes expected teacher income. The
cost of eﬀort function is quadratic around the eﬀort norm  t. Given this setup,
the condition (t  t) =
f
c deﬁnes socially optimal teacher eﬀort. To keep things
simple, I have chosen a setting such that optimal teacher eﬀort is the same
for all teachers regardless of the levels of h0 their students possess. However,
23performance standards in this setting will vary with h0.20
I begin by discussing the design of optimal contests against performance
standards in a setting where the authority understands teacher preferences and
the technology of instruction, knows the quantity '(h0) for each student and
observes p but not h at the end of the period. Let the authority deﬁne ^ p(h0;t)
as the expected measured performance for a student who begins the period with
human capital h0 and receives eﬃcient instruction from his teacher. Assume the
authority knows ^ p(h0;t) for each student and let the authority announce the
following contest scheme. Teachers receive their base salary independent of their
eﬀort choice. They also receive bonuses, , if the measured performance of their
students is greater than or equal to the relevant values of ^ p(h0;t). The problem
facing each teacher is
max
t
 [1   (^ p(h0;t)   '(h0)   gt)]  
c
2
(t    t)2
and the teacher’s ﬁrst order condition is
g(^ p(h0;t)   '(h0)   gt) = c(t    t)
Now, suppose that the authority chooses  =
f
g(0), then the solution to this
ﬁrst order condition becomes (t  t) =
f
c, and it is straightforward to show that
the second order condition for a local maximum is also satisﬁed at t. However,
more work is required to demonstrate that t is a global solution to the teacher’s
problem. If the density (v) falls too quickly as jvj increases, the teacher may
ﬁnd that the total cost of choosing t is greater than the expected return.21
Nonetheless, for reasonable parameterizations of this model, when the au-
thority sets the performance standard for a given teacher at ^ p(h0;t), there is a
prize associated with this standard that elicits eﬃcient eﬀort from the teacher,
and the teacher will win the prize with probability one half. This contest scheme
is a rather obvious place to begin, but there may be many other combinations of
prizes and targets that also elicit eﬃcient eﬀort from teachers. Consider chang-
ing the performance standard by an amount  while choosing a new prize level
f
g(), the ﬁrst order condition for a teacher choosing optimal eﬀort when fac-
ing a contest of the form

f
g(); ^ p(h0;t) + 

is satisﬁed at t, and for many
values of , t may remain the teacher’s optimal eﬀort choice.
20In versions where students learn at diﬀerent rates given the same instruction, the eﬃcient
level of instruction will vary among students even when all teachers are homogeneous. If
both teachers and students are heterogeneous, the social optimum also involves not only a
speciﬁcation of instruction levels for each student but also the assignment of students to
teachers.
21It is well established that one can design two person contests such that both workers
chose eﬃcient eﬀort as part of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. See Lazear and Rosen
(1981). However, these equilibria require that chance play a suﬃcient role in the outcome
of these contests. A contest against the standard ^ p(h0;t) is analogous to a game against a
machine that always chooses eﬃcient eﬀort, and by making sure that chance plays a suﬃcient
role in determining the outcome of such contests, the authority can ensure that the teacher’s
best response is to also choose eﬃcient eﬀort.
24Let 




g(); ^ p(h0;t) + 

. Given  2 
, each contest is associated
with an expected payoﬀ
f
g() [1   ()]. Based on the history of performance
pay experiments in public education, I assume that the base salary of teachers
is ﬁxed and that any prize money teachers earn from the introduction of perfor-
mance pay systems is additional income. Further, I assume that the education
authority’s goal is to minimize the additional payroll cost of introducing a con-
test scheme that induces eﬃcient eﬀort. Thus, the optimal  minimizes the
expected prize payoﬀ
f
g() [1   ()] subject to the constraint that  2 
. A
complete characterization of the solution to this problem is rather tedious, but
several features of the optimal solution are worth noting.
To begin, the optimal prize involves a scaling factor,
f
g, that parallels the
scale factor in our optimal piece rate formula in section 2.1. The issue of scaling
is front and center in any piece rate scheme, but the issue must also be confronted
in contest schemes. The authority needs to understand how to translate the scale
of the performance metric into values of student skill stocks in order to choose
prizes correctly.22
Turning to the choice of performance standard, the optimal  cannot be
negative. Since the authority is considering only contests,  2 
, that elicit
eﬃcient eﬀort,  < 0 implies that teachers win more often than in the  = 0
contest. Further, the prize
f
g() is larger than the prize in the  = 0 contest
because () is maximal at zero. These results imply that the expected cost of
the  = 0 contest is less than the expected cost for any  < 0 contest that
ellicits eﬃcient eﬀort.
Although the optimal contest involves   0, the authority must be careful
not to choose a  that is too large. If  is too demanding, teachers may ﬁnd
it optimal to choose some t < t because the total cost of choosing t exceeds
the expected increase in prize winnings from choosing t. For example, let (v)
represent a normal distribution with variance 2
v. Then, it is straightforward to
show that t is not an optimal response to any contest

f











To provide some insight into this condition, note that if f = 1 and g = 1,
then the unit of time used to measure t is the unit such that teachers raise the
expected value of a student’s human capital by one dollar when they allocate one
more unit of eﬀective instruction to the student. Further, the units of v are such
22Cuhna and Heckman (2008) discuss methods that allow researchers to map test scores
for youth into expected values of future adult outcomes like earnings. These methods cannot
provide direct evidence on the meaning of scales associated with new assessments unless there
are ways to equate the new assessment scales to the scales of tests taken when the current
generation of adults was in school. More work is needed in this area to provide better guidance
concerning the correct pricing of the psychometric performance measures used in performance
pay schemes.
23To see that the second order condition is violated for these values of  when t = t use
the fact that 0() =   
2
v
(): The optimal choice for t may be greater or less than t, but
cases involving ineﬃciently low levels of eﬀort are the main concern here.
25that one can think of these shocks to measured human capital as the equivalent
of deletions or additions to the total amount of instruction they receive. Here, in
contests where  > v
(t  t) v , the teacher’s second order condition is violated
at t. Thus, if one is willing to assume that the eﬀort innovation (t   t) oﬀsets
a one standard deviation shock of bad luck, then the optimal  2 [0;v].
Even though I have modeled a rather simple contest, a full characterization
of the optimal  is beyond the scope of this chapter. The point of deriving
bounds on the optimal  for this case is to demonstrate that it takes little eﬀort
to construct environments in which education authorities can easily make one of
two mistakes by choosing performance standards in an ad hoc way. First, since
() is the only prize such that the teacher’s ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed
when she chooses eﬀort t in response to a contest against the performance





ﬁnd that no prize exists such that both the ﬁrst and second order conditions of
the teacher’s problem are satisﬁed at t. It is possible to set standards that are
too high in the sense that, given such standards, there are no prizes that elicit
eﬃcient eﬀort. The typical outcome in these cases is that the authority chooses
a prize level that elicits less than eﬃcient eﬀort, but it is possible that the
authority could set a prize so large that teachers supplied more than eﬃcient
eﬀort.24 Second, authorities can set standards that are clearly too low and
waste resources relative to the  = 0 benchmark. Any contest that results
in signiﬁcantly more than half of the contestants winning a prize is either not
eliciting eﬃcient eﬀort or is wasting prize money.
2.6 Common Design Issues
Most performance pay programs adopt prizes and performance standards with-
out conducting any formal analyses of expected responses by teachers, and the
prevailing view seems to be that simply providing incentives through standards
and prizes should improve eﬀort allocation among teachers. However, the model
outlined here raises concerns about ad hoc approaches to the design of perfor-
mance contests. Contests that may seem reasonable to many can actually be
wasteful.
2.6.1 Setting Standards
Political forces often create pressure for “high standards” in education, but these
pressures can be counterproductive. Although it is clearly wasteful to set stan-
dards too low, standards well beyond ^ p(h0;t) may induce no additional eﬀort
from teachers.
The POINT program (2006-2009) allowed math teachers in grades 5 through
8 in Nashville, TN to volunteer for a performance pay program. The volunteers
24Further, although teachers in the model above never respond to incentives by choosing
t =  t because the quadratic cost function assumed here imposes a marginal eﬀort cost of zero
at  t, any ﬁxed cost associated with adjusting eﬀort away from the norm,  t, introduces the
possibility that teachers would respond to excessively demanding standards by staying at  t.
26were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. Those in the treat-
ment group were eligible for three levels of bonus pay: $5,000, $10,000, and
$15,000 dollars. The reward levels were linked to value-added performance tar-
gets associated with the 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles in the historical distri-
bution of student gains on the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program
(TCAP). Although these prizes are signiﬁcant relative to base levels of teacher
pay, Springer et al (2010) report that the students in treatment classrooms
typically performed no better than students in control classrooms.25 Further,
Springer at al (2010) are not reporting that the gains induced by the program
did not generalize. Rather, they report no clear pattern of gains on the high-
stakes assessment, TCAP.
It is tempting to say that the POINT results are quite puzzling, given the
size of the prizes involved in POINT and the balance of the existing literature on
educator responses to incentive schemes. However, it is just as important to note
that POINT may have set targets so high that teachers responded optimally by
doing roughly what they had done before, t   t. Springer et al (2010) provide
an appendix which claims that the expected marginal gains from more teacher
eﬀort were likely signiﬁcant for many teachers. However, their ﬁgures suggest
that roughly one half of the teachers in the experiment faced less than a twenty
percent chance of winning a bonus based on their past record of performance.
Although it is quite diﬃcult to determine what the marginal gains to eﬀort
were for any of the POINT teachers, it takes little creativity to choose cost and
density functions such that the one half of teachers who faced less than a twenty
percent chance of winning based on their past performance would have found it
optimal to remain at or near  t.
In the model above, all teachers are equally talented and thus share the
same cost of eﬀort, and this is likely not true of teachers in the POINT project.
However, the presence of teacher heterogeneity only increases the likelihood
that at least some teachers responded to the system with no change in eﬀort.
The estimated treatment eﬀects in the POINT project almost certainly reﬂect a
weighted average of many diﬀerent changes in teacher eﬀort, but researchers who
work with POINT data in the future should carefully investigate the possibility
that a signiﬁcant portion of POINT teachers optimally chose not to change their
eﬀort levels.
This observation is closely related to the literature on educational triage in
accountability systems. Many systems, including the implementation of NCLB
in many states, hold all students to a single proﬁciency standard. However, this
“high standards” for all approach often induces teachers to divert resources away
from some students who are currently in great need of special attention and who
also have no realistic chance of reaching proﬁciency in the near term. Gillborn
and Youdell (2000) began this literature with work on the responses of En-
glish schools to the structure of national exam systems. Neal and Schanzenbach
(2010) document this behavior among Chicago teachers following the introduc-
25There was some indication of improvement among ﬁfth graders after year one. However,
these impacts did not persist into sixth grade.
27tion of NCLB.
2.6.2 Handicapping
The POINT system used a simple value-added approach to transform test scores
into performance metrics for teachers. In terms of the model above, this pro-
cedure is an attempt to condition on '(h0) when setting standards for teacher
performance. It is obvious that all performance pay schemes based on targets
must solve this measurement problem. However, it is surprising how often pol-
icy makers have adopted rather heuristic approaches that produced less than
desirable results.
The MAP system now in place in Florida replaced an earlier system called
STAR. The STAR system attempted to assign points to teachers for diﬀerent
possible innovations in reading levels that their students might experience dur-
ing a given year. These point allocations formed a Value Table with rows for
each initial reading level, columns for each terminal reading level, and entries
that speciﬁed performance points for each possible outcome. The Value Table
methodology represented an attempt to make sure that all teachers competed
“on a level playing ﬁeld” as the law required.26 However, Neal (2009a) reports
that the initial results from Hillsborough County provided strong suggestive ev-
idence that the point allocations overstated the relative performance of teachers
who worked in aﬄuent schools, and the STAR system was altered and then
replaced shortly after its introduction.
The ABC system in North Carolina sets performance targets at the school
level and also uses rather ad hoc statistical procedures to attempt to control
for baseline diﬀerences in school characteristics. Vigdor (2009) reports that
this system may also be biased against schools that serve economically and
academically disadvantaged students, and Clotfelter et al (2004) report that
the introduction of ABC created a dramatic relative decline in the retention
rates of faculty in schools serving disadvantaged student populations. These
changes in retention rates are quite large, and there is no evidence that these
departures were concentrated among weak teachers.
Systems that employ statistical procedures to set performance targets must
be implemented with care. Any performance pay scheme that employs a statis-
tical procedure to set performance targets will create incentives for even good
teachers to leave their current students if the the procedures set performance
standards for these students that are too demanding relative to the standards
set for others.
2.6.3 Using the Wrong Sample
The response of many in the education research community to these observations
is that the STAR scheme, the ABC formula, and other ad hoc adjustment
26The method assigned positive points to student improvements and assigned more points
to improvements that are less common. Teachers received point deductions for students who
regressed.
28schemes are transparently ﬂawed. Advocates of value-added models (VAM)
contend that performance metrics without these ﬂaws are available. Consider
the following regression model:
yijt = xijt + Dijt + "ijt
Here, yijt is the test score of student i in classroom j at time t, and xijt is a set
of student, peer, and resources variables that serve as controls for the baseline
growth expected from student i: The matrix Dijt includes a set of dummy
variables that indicate the assignment of students to classrooms at time t, and
"ijt is an error term that captures shocks to measured performance. Regression
models of this form produce vectors ^  = (^ 1; ^ 2::: ^ J) that contain metrics of
classroom performance for all classrooms, j = 1;2;::J. Although I use j to
index classrooms, j can also index schools in systems where teachers receive
bonus pay for team performance. In either case, performance pay systems built
around the VAM approach award prizes to the teachers who work in schools or
classrooms associated with values of ^ j that exceed some target level.
VAM advocates contend that this approach is the best way to produce perfor-
mance metrics for educators that correctly control for diﬀerences among students
in the expected growth in measured achievement attributable to diﬀerences in
baseline growth among students, '(h0). However, in order to set appropriate
performance targets, policy makers also need to control for the expected mea-
sured gains from eﬃcient instruction, gt, and many implementations of VAM
fail to address this second issue.
The most wide spread and statistically sophisticated assessment based in-
centive program in the United States is TAP. TAP involves several components,
but the assessment based component involves running a regression like the one
above and giving teachers a score of one through ﬁve based on their rank in
the vector ^  = (^ 1; ^ 2::: ^ J). Teachers are then rewarded if they earn a score of
three or more. If one ignores the rounding procedure, TAP is essential paying a
bonus to teachers with measured performance above the median, and thus some
may see this system as analogous to the  = 0 contest above, i.e. the scheme
that employs ^ p(h0;t) as the performance standard. In this contest, all teachers
choose eﬃcient eﬀort and win the bonus with probability .5.
However, TAP is not analogous to the  = 0 contest. The VAM models
TAP uses to produce performance metrics for TAP teachers employ data from
both TAP and non-TAP schools. Because non-TAP teachers typically work
in schools without performance pay systems and because TAP addresses the
widely held belief that teacher eﬀort is not eﬃcient in many traditional public
schools, it makes sense to assume that many of the teachers in the VAM samples
are not supplying eﬃcient eﬀort. Thus, TAP is using VAM in a manner that
sets performance standards below the expected value of measured performance
given eﬃcient eﬀort, and the analysis above shows that contest schemes built
around standards set below ^ p(h0;t), i.e.  < 0, waste resources.
Nonetheless, the simple model above does predict that teachers will respond
to systems with “low” standards if the prizes are high enough, and in a recent
29study, Hudson (2010) reports that TAP does improve measured student perfor-
mance. Hudson compares school wide improvements in test score performance
following the introduction of TAP to test score changes in a composite set of
control schools that did not introduce TAP, and she ﬁnds that TAP does raise
math scores and may improve reading scores as well.
2.6.4 Holding the Line
So far, I have focused on how diﬃcult it may be for education authorities to
specify an eﬃcient system of performance standards and prize payments using
standard psychometric performance metrics. However, even if an education
authority were endowed with an eﬃcient system at a point in time, the authority
would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to maintain the integrity of its performance standards
over time. We have already discussed how coaching on the part of teachers
can inﬂate assessment results, but even in a world with no coaching or gaming,
placing the results of diﬀerent assessment forms on a common scale over time is
technically quite diﬃcult, which implies that it is diﬃcult to verify the integrity
of psychometric scales as well as any performance metrics derived from them.
Suppose that a political organization representing teachers put hidden pres-
sure on testing agencies to make assessments less challenging over time while
scoring them in the same manner. If this organization were successful, the
scores associated with various performance targets would correspond to lower
levels of teacher eﬀort and actual student skill, and the fact that the perfor-
mance standards had been compromised would be hard for the public or the
education oﬃcials that represent them to detect. Those who think this con-
cern is far fetched should consult the literature on the integrity of proﬁciency
standards under NCLB. A detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope
of this survey, but there is considerable evidence that political pressures have
compromised the meaning of proﬁciency scores over time under NCLB.27
In addition, the School-Wide Bonus Program in New York City may be an
example of problems that arise when changes in exam diﬃculty compromise
performance standards over time. Goodman and Turner (2010) describe an
experiment in New York city that began during the 2007-2008 school year and
continued through the 2008-09 school year. Schools could earn bonuses of either
$1,500 per teacher or $3,000 per teacher if they met targets for school improve-
ment scores. The improvement scores were weighted averages of measures of
progress in student achievement and measures of school environment factors
such as attendance and safety. The program required schools that began at
lower performance levels to meet higher improvement targets in order to win a
bonus. The program involved competition at the school level, but compensation
committees at each winning school divided the bonus monies among teachers,
and in many instances, the committees exercised their discretion and deviated
from an equal sharing rule.
Because the program was announced in the middle of the 2007-2008 school
27See Cronin et al (2007) and Neal (2010).
30year, 2008-2009 was the ﬁrst year that the program was in place before the
school year began. In 2008-2009, 135 of 152 treatment schools (89%) won the
maximum prize of $3,000 per teacher, and there is scant evidence that the pro-
gram had any positive impacts on student achievement. The program is quite
complicated, and it was layered on top of the New York City accountability
system. The failure of the program to impact student achievement may reﬂect
confusion about exactly how the program worked as well as the fact that many
schools in the treatment and control samples already faced signiﬁcant perfor-
mance pressures from the accountability system. However, there is another
possibility. It is widely believed that the state assessments used to generate
student achievement and school performance measures became easier over time
starting in 2007 and that the scoring and scaling of these assessments did not
reﬂect these changes in exam diﬃculty. It is almost impossible to know the
extent to which teachers were aware of this trend, but ex post, the program
operated almost like a change in base pay. Although treatment schools did not
perform better than control schools, more than 91% of treatment schools won
a bonus, and 89% of treatment schools won the maximum prize.
2.6.5 Subjective Targets
Private sector ﬁrms also face diﬃcult performance measurement issues, and
these ﬁrms rarely rely solely on statistical methods to solve these problems.
Instead, schemes that link rewards to subjective performance evaluations are
common in the private sector. Several of the entries in Table 1 describe systems
that link performance pay for educators to subjective evaluation schemes, and
despite their prominence in private industry, the results of these schemes in
public education are not impressive.
The Performance Related Pay (PRP) system in England involves two forms
of bonus pay for teachers who have already reached the maximum pay level in
the standard pay scale. The ﬁrst is a permanent increase in base salary. The
second involves future opportunities to move up to even higher levels of base
pay dictated by an extended salary schedule. Atkinson et al (2009) examine the
performance of eligible versus ineligible teachers following the introduction of
this system in 1999, and they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of eligibility on student
performance. When they attempt to correct these estimates for experience
diﬀerences between eligible teachers and non-eligible teachers, their results imply
that the program increased teacher performance in science but may have harmed
teacher performance in math and English.
In sum, there is little clear evidence that the PRP system improved instruc-
tion in English schools, and given the process that determined awards, some may
not be surprised by this result. The initial cohort of eligible teachers were those
who were already at the top level of the standard pay scale. These teachers ap-
plied for a permanent increase in base pay and movement to a new promotion
and salary schedule by submitting cases which contained evidence that their
“students are making progress as good or better than similar students nation-
ally.” Wragg et al (2001) report that 88% of eligible teachers applied and 97% of
31those who applied received the award. Unless the returns to teacher experience
in England are quite exceptional, the oﬃcials who reviewed these cases adopted
a lenient interpretation of “as good or better.”
Martins (2009) describes a similar performance pay program implemented
in Portugal in 2006-2007. This program linked promotion to a higher salary
schedule and one-time cash prizes to individual teacher performance evaluations.
These evaluations were supposed to consider the performance of students on
internal and external exams, feedback from parents on teacher performance,
attendance records, and participation in research and professional development
activities. However, these evaluations were not conducted by independent third
party inspectors. Martins writes that “criteria for progression (promotion and
prizes) were to be assessed at each school, by those teachers (already) in the
higher pay scale.”
Using private school students and students on Portuguese Islands,28Martins
ﬁnds that student exam scores on internal tests remained ﬂat or fell slightly
following the reform, and scores on national exams fell substantially. Martins
does not have an experimental control sample, but the results he reports are so
negative that it is diﬃcult to believe that the Portuguese system produced any
real achievement gains for students, and students may have been harmed.
In private ﬁrms, the person who evaluates a worker’s performance is either
an owner of the ﬁrm or an agent of the owner. In public education, subjec-
tive performance evaluation is more problematic because many principals and
administrators work under employment and salary rules that create only weak
links between the quality of their personnel decisions and their own compen-
sation. Thus, some may not be surprised that performance pay systems that
involve one group of public employees making subjective determinations about
the bonus payments given to another group of public employees did not generate
noteworthy gains in student achievement.29
Still, the English and Portuguese systems are not unique. Many of the
entries in Table 1 involve systems in which educators are involved in creating
the performance standards that they or their coworkers are required to meet in
order to earn a bonus. The ProComp system in Denver, the Qcomp system in
Minnesota, and the MAP system in Florida all involve district or school level
discretion in deﬁning the performance standards that determine performance
pay. These programs have not been formally evaluated, but one must worry
that these systems may morph into vehicles for raising the base pay of most or
all teachers whether or not these teachers improve their performance.
2.6.6 The Value of Relative Performance Systems
Education oﬃcials can avoid some of the problems highlighted thus far in sec-
tion 2.6 if they commit to performance pay schemes that are true relative per-
28Azores and Madeira implemented weaker versions of the performance pay reforms.
29See Prendergast (1999) for a discussion of problems that may arise in subjective evaluation
systems within large private organizations if agency problems exist between managers and
owners.
32formance systems. In relative performance schemes, there is a ﬁxed amount of
prize money set aside, and all of the prize money is distributed to some worker or
workers ex post based on relative performance comparisons among the workers.
The reliance on relative performance measures means that some teachers will
win and others will lose by construction. Thus, there is no way to manipulate
these systems so that every worker receives a bonus even if no worker improved
their performance. It is quite diﬃcult to convert relative performance schemes
into changes in base pay through corruption activities, whether the activities
involve corruption of psychometric standards or manipulation of subjective per-
formance evaluations.30
Further, relative performance schemes can provide information that the ed-
ucation authority needs to maintain the value of incentive schemes over time.
Even if an authority knew the level of measured performance associated with
eﬃcient eﬀort at a point in time, developments in pedagogy, changes in assess-
ments, or contamination of performance metrics may cause this level to rise
or fall over time. In some environments, the authority can use movements in
average measured performance to infer how levels of measured performance as-
sociated with eﬃcient eﬀort are moving over time. Competition among teachers
in relative performance systems may provide valuable information about the lev-
els of measured performance that are associated with eﬃcient classroom eﬀort.
Thus, VAM methods on samples of teachers who all face the same incentive
system may create adequate control for both student diﬀerences in expected
baseline achievement growth and the eﬃcient levels of instruction that the sys-
tem induces teachers to allocate to students.31
Table 1 describes three systems that involve both competition among edu-
cators for a ﬁxed set of prizes and the use of VAM methods to rank schools or
teachers. Ladd (1999), Lavy (2002), and Lavy (2009) all contain evaluations of
experimental performance pay schemes. Ladd (1999) describes a system imple-
mented in Dallas in 1991. The Dallas system was a tournament among schools.
Schools received performance scores based on estimates of average value added
in the school as well as measures of attendance and drop-out rates. The VAM es-
timates of school performance employed scores from several diﬀerent assessment
systems, and the procedure produced measures of relative school improvement
in performance. Each year, about 20 percent of the schools won performance
bonuses. All staﬀ in winning schools received a bonus. Principals and teachers
received one thousand dollars.
Lavy (2002) describes a tournament among secondary schools in Israel that
took place in 1995-1997. Here, secondary schools received performance scores
based on estimates of their contributions to improvement in three areas: credit
units per student, the fraction of students receiving a matriculation certiﬁcate,
30If all teachers could collude on low eﬀort, then the prizes would be handed out each period
based on measurement error and each teacher would enjoy an increase in expected base pay
without changing their eﬀort. However, it seems unlikely that teachers in an entire school
district or state could maintain such collusion.
31See Holmstrom (1982). Barlevy and Neal (2010) describe speciﬁcally how this insight
applies to the design of incentive systems for educators.
33and the school drop out rate. The top one third of schools received awards that
varied with the overall performance ranking of the schools. The largest prize
resulted in bonuses for teachers that equaled roughly ﬁve percent of the starting
salary for a new teacher. The smallest prize generated bonuses that were one
fourth as large.
Lavy (2009) describes a tournament among individual Israeli secondary
school teachers in 2000-2001. Individual teachers received performance scores
based on the average score of their students on the matriculation exam and their
students’ pass rate. Teachers who taught the same subject competed against
each other. Further, because the regression models used to produce relative
performance measures included school ﬁxed eﬀects, teachers were competing
against other teachers in their school and were rewarded for being exceptional
relative to their peers. The program ranked teachers according to pass rate
performance and average score performance and used a point system to form an
aggregate ranking. The pass rate score contributed more to the overall teacher
ranking. Winners received performance pay bonuses based on their total per-
formance index, and the top performers received large bonuses.
None of these programs involved random assignment of schools or teachers to
treatment. Thus, the authors employ several empirical strategies that attempt
to pin down the causal impacts of these programs. Although some may quibble
with the details of any one of these three papers, the results taken as a whole
paint a fairly consistent picture. All three papers ﬁnd that these programs gen-
erated signiﬁcant increases in measured achievement among students, but all
three also report signiﬁcant heterogeneity in estimated treatment eﬀects for dif-
ferent sub-populations. Ladd (1999) reports that the Dallas program generated
large gains for white and Hispanic students but not for Black students. Lavy
(2002) and Lavy (2009) ﬁnd that both Israeli programs generated larger im-
provements among students with lower baseline performance as well as students
from less educationally advantaged families, but Lavy also notes that both pro-
grams included design features that generated stronger incentives for teachers
to direct relatively more attention to weak students.
None of these three papers have access to the type of low-stakes assessment
data required to make deﬁnitive statements about the generalizability of the
measured gains induced by these programs. However, the Dallas system may
have been more diﬃcult than many to game because it involved test data from
several diﬀerent assessment systems as well as measures of attendance and drop-
out rates. Further, Lavy (2009) presents evidence that the Israeli program
induced substantial changes in teacher eﬀort and pedagogy.
All of these systems represent components of experimental programs. I know
of no on-going large scale performance pay systems in education that are true
relative performance pay schemes. This outcome may reﬂect that fact that
teachers and their unions recognize that relative performance schemes cannot
be manipulated into systems that simply change base pay for all teachers.
342.6.7 Aggregation
Although the programs described in Ladd (1999), Lavy (2002), and Lavy (2009)
appear to have worked fairly well, the tournament structure of these programs
raises important implementation questions. In a world where each teacher has
only one student, tournaments would be relatively easy to implement. One
could deﬁne leagues based on baseline student characteristics, and the within-
league rank of each student would determine whether or not his teacher won a
prize.
However, because teachers and schools work with many students at one
time, the construction of performance rankings based on assessment data is not
so straightforward. Imagine a setting with assessments that produced perfectly
reliable measures of student skill. Further, suppose one teacher had two students
who both began the year with a math score of 150 and then ended the year with
scores of 155 and 160. Finally, suppose another teacher had two students who
began the year with scores of 100 and 200 respectively and ended the year with
scores of 110 and 205 respectively. Based on such data, how could one rank the
performance of the two teachers without understanding the values to society of
bringing students from 100 to 110, 150 to 155, 150 to 160, or 200 to 205?
The VAM methods used in all three experiments assert that our two hy-
pothetical teachers performed equally well simply because the average score
improvement in both hypothetical classrooms was 7.5. The experiments in Dal-
las and Israel took the average of VAM residuals to create performance ranks
for classrooms and sometimes schools, and one must ask when averages that are
expressed in units of a particular psychometric scale provide valid rankings of
total performance for schools or teachers. These averages provide valid rankings
if the VAM model is correctly speciﬁed and if scores on a given psychometric
scale are a ﬁxed aﬃne transformation of the social value of the underlying skill
levels associated with various scores. Put diﬀerently if pijt = yijt = ahijt + c
where yijt is the test score for student i in class j in period t, hijt is the social
value of this student’s skills at the end of period t; and a > 0 and c are constants,
then VAM rankings of classroom of school performance will be accurate.
Yet, if an education authority could create a psychometric scale with these
magical properties, then pay for performance schemes based on piece rates must
be considered as serious policy options.32 The absence of piece rate schemes in
practice may reﬂect many factors, but I conjecture that a key factor is that the
use of piece rates would focus attention on the fact that education authorities
do not know whether or not a teacher who moves a child from 150 to 155 on
a given developmental scale is creating greater, lesser, or equal social value
than a teacher who moves a child from 200 to 205. But, if this is one reason
that we do not observe piece-rates schemes based on VAM estimates of teacher
performance metrics, there is no reason to accept VAM rankings as ex post
performance rankings that determine the allocations of prizes in a tournament.
32Many tournament schemes, like those in the Israeli and Dallas experiments, cannot elicit
ﬁrst best eﬀort from all participants unless all teachers are equally talented, but piece rate
systems are eﬃcient even in the presence of worker heterogeneity.
35Many VAM estimators are quite complex, and the literature contains lengthy
debates about the relative value of diﬀerent VAM approaches, but the results
from all VAM models are sensitive to the psychometric scaling of assessment
results, and this fact should give advocates of these models pause.33
Further, in some contexts, the literal interpretation of VAM performance
rankings indicts the whole enterprise. Imagine two ﬁfth grade math teachers
in a large district. Both are supposed to take their students as far as they
can through a common curriculum, but one teacher works with children in a
disadvantaged school who began elementary school not knowing how to count
and the other teaches in a selective magnet school designed for gifted children.
Now, assume that the test score results from both teachers’ classes are part of a
state or district wide sample used as inputs into a VAM model that produces a
vector ^  which contains a performance measure for all ﬁfth grade math teachers
in the district. The elements of ^  associated with our two hypothetical teachers
are supposed to tell us which teacher performed better during the year or at
least which teacher one should expect to have performed better. However, these
two teachers did not do the same job because they worked with students who
were at completely diﬀerent places in their academic development, and thus
it seems almost nonsensical to ask which teacher did better. Functional form
assumptions and the assumption that the units of a given psychometric scale
serve as a welfare index allow VAM to rank the performances of these two
teachers, but the fact that some applications of VAM provide clear answers to
nonsensical questions should be a source of concern for VAM advocates and not
a selling point for VAM methods.
2.7 Steps Forward
In the previous sections, I described how hidden actions like coaching contami-
nate the information in high-stakes assessments, and I also discussed how hidden
manipulations or subjective determinations of performance targets may trans-
form performance pay schemes into increases in expected base pay for teachers
without commensurate changes in teacher eﬀort. Finally, I discussed the bene-
ﬁts of performance pay schemes based on measures of relative performance but
noted the problems that may arise when policy makers create performance met-
rics that depend on the implicit assumption that particular psychometric scales
serve as proxies for welfare indices.
In recent work with Gadi Barlevy, Barlevy and Neal (2010), we describe a
performance pay scheme for educators with the following properties: (i) educa-
tors compete against each other for a ﬁxed set of prize money (ii) reward pay
is based on rankings of individual student outcomes. No measure of classroom
or school output is involved and no composite ranking of educator performance
is created (iii) the mapping between student assessment results and the per-
formance pay given to speciﬁc teachers is invariant to the scale used to report
33See Briggs and Betebenner (2009), Briggs and Weeks (2009), Reardon and Raudenbush
(2009) for more on this issue.
36assessment results, and (iv) because the system is scale invariant, it can be
implemented using a series of assessments that contain no repeated items and
no common format, which removes opportunities for teachers to coach students
concerning particular formats or items used in previous assessments.
The system we propose is called “pay for percentile” and it works as follows.
Consider the population of students taking ﬁfth grade math in a state or a large
school district. At the beginning of the year, place each of these students in a
comparison set that contains other students with similar records of academic
achievement, common family backgrounds, and similar peers. Then, at the
end of the school year, give each student a percentile score that describes the
fraction of students in his comparison set that performed less well than he did.
Average these percentile scores over all the ﬁfth grade math students in a given
classroom or school and call this average a percentile performance index. This
index is a winning percentage. It tells us how often students in a given unit
perform better than students in other units who began the year at the same
achievement levels. Finally, pay educators bonuses that are proportional to
their percentile performance indices.34
Note that this system relies only on the ordinal information in assessment
results, and because only ranks within comparison sets matter, this system does
not require and never produces a measure or ranking of overall educator per-
formance. All students compete in seeded contests against students in other
schools, and performance pay for educators is determined by the overall win-
ning percentage of their students in these contests. Even though some teacher
actions, e.g. lesson planning, group tutoring, classroom lectures, simultaneously
aﬀect the expected contest outcomes for many of their students, we show that
such a scheme can elicit eﬃcient eﬀort from all teachers on all tasks that create
human capital in their students.
Because pay for percentile employs only information concerning relative
ranks, it provides no information that allows education authorities to under-
stand how student performance is evolving over time or how the performance of
a school is evolving over time. However, as I argue above, separating incentive
provision and performance measurement eliminates incentives for educators to
take actions that contaminate performance measurements. Education authori-
ties can always measure progress in student achievement using parallel assess-
ment systems that involve no stakes for educators and also contain the overlap
in item content and format that make proper equating possible. By making
this system a no-stakes system, education authorities remove incentives for ed-
ucators to engage in the coaching and manipulation activities that currently
contaminate the information produced by many accountability systems.
34Classroom size and the eﬃcient prize in a standard two person contest determine this
constant of proportionality. The Barlevy and Neal (2010) framework extends the two con-
testant, single output tournament model of Lazear and Rosen (1981) to a setting with many
contestants and many distinct but jointly produced outputs. In the context of education, the
human capital acquired by each student is a distinct output, but the set of outputs produced
in the classroom are produced jointly by choosing a vector of time allocations to diﬀerent
tasks, e.g lesson planning, lecturing, small group instruction, and individual tutoring.
372.7.1 Team Competition
Lavy (2009) reports some positive eﬀects of an incentive scheme that forces
teachers to compete against other teachers in the same school, and Muralid-
haran and Sundararaman (2010) report that the incentive scheme that linked
piece rates bonuses to individual teacher performance in India generated larger
measured achievement gains than the scheme that paid team piece-rates. While
some may be tempted to conclude that individual incentives are important as a
means for overcoming free rider problems, there are beneﬁts from implementing
pay for percentile as a team competition rather than competition among indi-
vidual teachers. Although the experimental results appear positive, systems like
the one Lavy (2009) describes could create serious problems if implemented as
permanent policies.
The presence of school ﬁxed eﬀects in the Israeli VAM models used to create
teacher performance measures implies that the performance of each teacher is
being measured relative to the average performance of teachers in her school.
This convention creates a clear incentive for teachers to sabotage the work of
their peers. Sabotage may not have been a problem in a short-lived experiment
where teachers may or may not have fully understood the construction of per-
formance metrics. However, the Jacob and Levitt (2003) results suggest that
one should not assume that teachers are unwilling to engage in such behaviors
when permanent incentive schemes create clear incentives for such malfeasance.
Systems that involve individual incentive pay but no direct competition
among teachers working in the same school are less problematic, but education
authorities may still prefer to have teachers compete in teams. The persons
who may possess the best information about how a particular ﬁfth grade math
teacher in a given school can improve are the other ﬁfth grade math teachers
in the same school. Incentive systems should encourage these teachers to share
this information rather than withhold it. Thus, it makes sense to allow all the
teachers who teach a given subject in a particular grade to compete as a team
against teachers in other schools that serve similar communities and students.
These teams are often so small that free riding should not be a huge concern and
peer monitoring should be quite eﬀective. The majority of incentive schemes
described in Table 1 are team incentive schemes, and all of the team incentive
plans did generate improvements in measured achievement.
There are also statistical reasons to prefer inter-school rather than intra-
school competition. Barlevy and Neal (2010) discuss how existing methods in
educational statistics can be adapted to estimate percentile performance indices,
and a key assumption in these methods, and other methods used to create ed-
ucational performance metrics, is that the conditioning sets that deﬁne league
competition are so rich that one can treat the assignment of teachers to stu-
dents as random given these conditioning variables. It may be easier to satisfy
this requirement when performance pay contests involve only inter-school com-
petition. Rothstein (2010) presents evidence from North Carolina data that,
within schools, unobserved dimensions of student aptitude aﬀect the allocation
of student among classrooms, and it makes sense that this would be the case. In
38order to maximize the human capital created in their schools, principals must
use all the information at their disposal to make optimal matches between stu-
dents and teachers. Furthermore, any system that asks teachers within the same
school to compete against each other may create resistance from some teachers
to accept the students who should optimally be assigned to them. However, at
the school level or grade level within a school, every student must be assigned to
some teacher, and inter-school competition for team bonuses creates incentives
for teachers and principals to make sure that students are assigned optimally
among teachers.
While it is true that there may still be concerns about selection among
schools by parents, it may be possible when implementing performance pay
schemes at the level of a state or country to form leagues for schools to com-
pete in such that schools are well matched on the measured characteristics
of students, communities, and parents, and no two schools in the same league
serve geographic areas that intersect. Given this arrangement, no parents would
have chosen their child’s particular school over any of the other schools in their
school’s league, and concerns about selection into schools on unobserved family
traits may be less severe.
2.7.2 Limitations of Assessment-Based Incentives
The design of pay for percentile removes opportunities for teachers to coach stu-
dents for upcoming assessments based on the speciﬁc items and format found in
previous assessment. Further, this scheme avoids many thorny issues that arise
when education authorities attempt to build performance pay systems that are
dependent on the scaling of psychometric performance measures. However, any
assessment-based performance pay scheme for educators will create alignment
problems, and pay for percentile is no exception. Educators still beneﬁt from
cheating, e.g. giving students answers during the exam. Further, assessment-
based schemes do not reward teachers for building non-cognitive skills that are
not assessed.
Concerns about cheating can potentially be addressed by mandating that all
assessments be monitored by third party testing agencies, but concerns about
teachers diverting eﬀort away from the development of important social and
emotional skills must be addressed by building systems that reward teachers for
contributing to their students’ non-cognitive development. Many of the systems
described in Table 1 are systems involving multiple components, and while I have
focused on the assessment-based components of each program, the presence of
other components is an important design issue. Many reasonable social welfare
functions imply that the optimal set of personnel policies for educators should
create incentives for teachers to foster both the cognitive and non-cognitive
development of their students. In the next section, I will discuss a strategy for
eliciting information from parents concerning the performance of educators with
regard to the social and emotional development of children.
392.7.3 Heterogeneity
All incentive pay schemes in education that are built around statistical perfor-
mance metrics appear to be designed as mechanisms for eliciting eﬀort from a
homogeneous group of teachers. The schemes described in Table 1 that involve
statistical targets involve targets that are the same for all teachers holding con-
stant the characteristics of their students. Further, the tournament schemes
employed in Israel and Dallas involve no handicapping. Given student charac-
teristics, all teachers compete on equal footing. Pay for percentile is similar.
However, if teachers diﬀer in the talent levels, one common set of perfor-
mance standards cannot elicit eﬃcient eﬀort from all teachers. Further, simple
tournament schemes typically do not elicit eﬃcient eﬀort from heterogeneous
contests without some handicapping system.
Thus, if the education authority can observe teacher characteristics that
serve as exogenous proxies for eﬀective talent, then the authority can improve
eﬃciency by seeding contests based not only on student characteristics but also
on these teacher characteristics as well as measures of resources within the
classroom that may aﬀect teacher eﬀectiveness.35 If this seeding process creates
competition among teams of teachers such that teams who compete against each
other have symmetric beliefs about their true talent levels, then there will exist
prizes such that these seeded contests elicit eﬃcient eﬀort from all teachers.
However, if some teams of teachers know that they are either better or worse
than the typical team of teachers that shares their characteristics, then more
elaborate mechanisms are required.36
Some may advocate piece-rate schemes as a strategy for inducing eﬃcient ef-
fort from heterogeneous teachers. While I have already noted that this approach
requires that education authorities translate an entire psychometric scale into
monetary units, another implementation concern may be even more important.
Tournament schemes can be implemented using a ﬁxed amount of money that
the authority introduces as an addition to total teacher compensation. Thus,
tournaments allow existing teachers to know that they will not receive wage cuts
following the introduction of incentive pay, and they allow education authorities
to know ex ante exactly how much the incentive scheme will cost.
These features are attractive politically, but no piece-rate scheme can provide
both of these features at once. In piece-rate schemes that involve relative pay
for performance, teachers who perform well below average must receive salary
reductions, and it is possible that those who perform at the lowest levels would
owe performance ﬁnes in excess of their base salaries. This observation may
oﬀer insight into the fact that none of the systems described in Table 1 involve
35Examples include class size, the presence of a teacher’s aide, teacher experience, computer
resources, etc.
36Barlevy and Neal (2010) discuss how heterogeneity in teacher talent aﬀects the properties
of pay for percentile and other tournament schemes. Several authors have proposed more
complex tournament schemes that address heterogeneity directly but are also more diﬃcult
to implement. O’Keeﬀe et al (1984) and Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988) present contest
schemes that involve heterogenous contestants selecting the measurement rules and payoﬀ
rules that they will compete under.
40piece rates linked to relative performance measures.
The two piece rate schemes in India and Arkansas link performance pay to
absolute measures of teacher output. These schemes guarantee non-negative
bonuses for all teachers. However, these programs create the possibility that
total prize winnings will exceed the budget an authority has set aside ex ante.
Further, although both programs were experiments that lasted only a few years,
any absolute piece rate scheme implemented as a permanent policy would invite
the corruption and cheating activities expected in all scale dependent incentive
systems, and these activities could generate signiﬁcant growth in total bonus
pay over time even if the distribution of teacher performance remained ﬁxed
over time.
2.7.4 Back to Screening
I began section 2 by looking at models of screening in which teachers supplied
eﬀort inelastically but enjoyed diﬀerent levels of talent, but most of section 2
implicitly addresses settings where teachers are homogeneous with respect to
their talent levels, or at least homogeneous given a set of observed character-
istics, and the goal is to design performance schemes that elicit eﬃcient eﬀort.
The agenda for future research in this area should be the design of systems that
dictate seeded relative performance contests at each stage of a teacher’s career
while permitting the entire history of winning percentages in these contests to
aﬀect not only performance bonuses but also base pay, pension beneﬁts, reten-
tion decisions, and the seeding of future contests among remaining teachers. It
is not clear how well education authorities can do if they seek to design systems
that both screen and provide incentives. The dynamic aspects of such systems
create new complications because teachers know that performance today may
not only aﬀect compensation today but also whom they compete against in the
future. Further, team incentive schemes are useful for encouraging eﬀective co-
operation within schools, but measures of individual teacher performance may
be most useful for retention policies. In sum, the existing economics of educa-
tion literature contains considerable research on the construction of methods for
evaluating the impacts of performance pay systems or other incentive systems
in education, but the literature on the design of these systems remains quite
small and limited in scope, and there is much work to be done.
3 Markets
I note above that, even if pay for percentile or some other assessment based
incentive scheme can be used to induce all teachers in publicly funded schools
to teach their students in ways that promote mastery of the topics speciﬁed in a
common curriculum, most parents and public oﬃcials want teachers to be more
than conduits of academic information. Parents want their children to feel safe
at school, and they want their children to develop emotionally and socially as
well as cognitively. Thus, even if education oﬃcials develop an assessment based
41incentive scheme that induces teachers to teach well, they must also address the
concern that schools will spend too much time on academics at the expense of
the social and emotional development of children.
This observation implies that assessment based incentive schemes can never
be more than one component of the incentive systems that publicly funded
schools face. However, it is not obvious how education oﬃcials should develop
incentive schemes that direct the eﬀorts of educators regarding the non-cognitive
development of children. It is not at all clear that education oﬃcials will ever be
able to design assessments of non-cognitive skills that are both extensive enough
and reliable enough to use as a basis for incentive pay.
In the absence of systems that directly assess non-cognitive skills, education
authorities need to consider indirect mechanisms. Although many education
policy debates frame assessment based accountability and expansions of parental
choice as opposing alternative mechanisms for eliciting better performance from
publicly funded schools, I have written in Neal (2009a) that these policies are
best seen as complements. Once policy makers recognize that assessment-based
accountability proposals, almost by deﬁnition, ignore non-cognitive skill devel-
opment, it is natural to consider these questions: Who possesses good infor-
mation about the non-cognitive development of children, and who faces strong
incentives to truthfully report information they possess about the non-cognitive
development of children? “Parents” is a good answer to both questions, and the
value of voucher systems, charter school expansions, and other policies that ex-
pand school choice is that they provide a means of enlisting millions of parents
as performance monitors. Further, education oﬃcials can induce these perfor-
mance monitors to reveal what they are observing using relative simple market
mechanisms.
Three recent papers, Barrow and Rouse (2009), Figlio (2009), and Neal
(2009b), review the literature on the eﬀects of private schooling and the eﬀects
of access to private schools through voucher programs in particular. Three
important conclusions stand out as themes concerning the impacts of vouchers in
developed countries. First, the measured cognitive beneﬁts of access to private
schools through voucher programs are often modest. Second, the eﬀects of
voucher access on parental and student satisfaction are often large. Third, access
to private schools often creates substantial gains in total education attainment.
Given the existence of at least three recent survey papers on this topic, I
will not provide another literature review here. However, I do note that the
literature as a whole implies that vouchers often allow parents to ﬁnd schools
for their children that are better matches on dimensions other than academic
quality, and better matches apparently lead to more attainment. If parents
do possess the ability to evaluate important non-academic aspects of school
performance, then it makes sense to consider mechanisms that provide incentives
and opportunities for parents to use their evaluations in ways that shape the
behavior of educators who receive public funds.37
37Further, there is evidence that private schools oﬀer an even broader set of beneﬁts for
students in developing countries. Andrabi et al (2010) examine outcomes for private school
42Neal (2009a) outlines a framework for designing systems that distribute pub-
lic funds among schools that combines features of assessment-based accountabil-
ity systems and voucher systems. In this framework, all schools, both private
and public, compete on multiple dimensions for public funding. Student as-
sessment results, the results of school inspections, feedback from parents, and
parental choices aﬀect whether or not a given school is eligible to receive funding
and the level of funding it receives in a given year. Much more work is required
before researchers can oﬀer speciﬁc guidance concerning the optimal mapping
from these varied signals of school performance into the funding levels enjoyed
by schools, but assessment based performance pay and vouchers may work well
together in systems that require schools to compete for public resources on all
relevant dimensions of school performance.
By creating competition among schools for students and public resources,
such a system also creates competition among schools for teachers. I noted
above that subjective performance pay schemes have produced questionable
results in public education, and this presumably reﬂects the fact that educational
administrators are not always penalized when they give raises or promotion
to undeserving teachers. However, in a managed competition framework, all
the teachers in a school as well as the administrators in the school know that
the future capacity of the school to provide higher salaries for its employees is
directly inﬂuenced by the quality of its personnel policies. The best solutions
to the screening and incentive provision problems described above may arise as
byproducts of a system that forces schools to compete for the public support they
receive. A competitive market for teachers allows schools to build reputations as
employers that reward teachers for excellent performance on all dimensions and
also allows teachers to beneﬁt from building their own personal reputations.38
Nonetheless, Neal (2009b) points out that, while many countries now have
systems that operate like voucher systems and force schools to compete for
students, no developed country with a large voucher system allows schools to
compete for teachers by following diﬀerent personnel policies. Systems that
force schools to compete for public funding but also force all schools that re-
ceive public funding to hire, train, reward, and ﬁre teachers according to a ﬁxed
set of personnel policies are incoherent from a design perspective. In any in-
dustry, increased competition among ﬁrms oﬀers the possibility that the ﬁrms
which remain in the market going forward will be those who have successfully
children in Pakistan. They do not have a voucher experiment that generates random variation
in private school access, but they do build an instrumental variables strategy by exploiting
interactions between the location of families, the location of public schools, and the historic
pattern of settlement in rural villages. They ﬁnd enormous positive eﬀects of private schooling
on achievement even though public schools are funded at much higher levels. Angrist et al
(2006) report results from a voucher experiment in Colombia. The vouchers covered roughly
half of the cost of private schooling and were assigned by lottery. The study used comparisons
between lottery winners and losers to estimate the impacts of being oﬀered access to private
schooling. The implied achievement gains associated with private school access were large, and
the authors conclude that the implied increase in expected adult earnings among recipients
likely exceed the cost of the program.
38See Hoxby (2002) for more on how competition for teachers could aﬀect who teaches and
how.
43adopted new and more eﬃcient means of production. Teachers are the key in-
put in educational production. Thus, policies that govern the hiring, training,
retention, and motivating of teachers should have large impacts on the eﬃciency
of schools. Thus, provisions that restrict how schools may compete for teach-
ers may well limit the eﬃciency gains from systems that promote competition
among schools for students.
4 Conclusion
Current research in the economics of education devotes considerable attention to
the methods that researchers use to evaluate the impacts of various innovations
in public education policy. It is appropriate that researchers devote great energy
to the tasks of discovering what works best and developing methods that actually
help us discern what works best. However, economists should begin contributing
more to debates among scholars and policy makers concerning how performance
pay programs are designed before they are ever implemented and evaluated.
Most of the programs reviewed here provide some evidence that teachers
responded to performance pay schemes by changing their eﬀort allocations in
some way, and in many cases, there is at least strong suggestive evidence that
total teacher eﬀort rose following the introduction of performance pay. Two
of the exceptions to this rule are the bonus schemes in England and Portugal
that relied on subjective assessments made by either education oﬃcials or peer
teachers. Ex post, these programs appear to have been vehicles for increas-
ing the baseline pay scale of experienced teachers without requiring improved
teacher performance. Whether or not this outcome was anticipated by the po-
litical champions of these programs, the lesson taught by these programs, and
a larger literature on performance pay in other organizations, is that subjective
bonus schemes should not be expected to work well unless they are part of a
larger incentive system that provides incentives for those who make subjective
performance evaluations to make these evaluations accurately.
The POINT program also stands out as a program that generated few mea-
surable impacts, but the lesson that POINT teaches is diﬀerent. The perfor-
mance standards in POINT are completely objective. However, it is not clear
that these standards were set at levels that make eﬃcient incentive provision
possible. While there may be other plausible explanations for the POINT re-
sults, the simple model developed in section 2.5 highlights the possibility that
POINT simply set the performance standards too high. Further, whether or not
this is true in the case of POINT, the theoretical results from section 2.5 provide
an important warning for those who design incentive schemes around psycho-
metric performance targets. It is simply not true that education authorities can
choose performance standards in an ad hoc manner and then experiment with
diﬀerent prize levels until they discover a prize level that will elicit eﬃcient eﬀort
given their initial choice of standard. Given some performance targets, there is
no prize level that would induce eﬃcient eﬀort.
Concerns about the choice of performance standards as well as the manip-
44ulation of performance standards can be mitigated to some extent if education
authorities require that all incentive schemes involve pay for relative perfor-
mance. When authorities force educators to compete for a ﬁxed amount of
reward money, well designed contests can reveal the expected level of mea-
sured performance that is associated with eﬃcient eﬀort levels among teachers.
When oﬃcials allow competition to determine standards endogenously, they
make it diﬃcult for educators or their representatives to compromise perfor-
mance standards or prevent standards from rising over time as new technologies
and teaching methods make better performance possible.
Nonetheless, even in relative performance schemes, manipulation of perfor-
mance metrics remains a concern. While relative performance schemes eliminate
many scenarios in which standards are manipulated so that all teachers receive
bonuses without actually improving their performance, educators in these con-
tests may be taking actions that are privately beneﬁcial because they raise
measured relative performance but are also socially wasteful because these ac-
tions are crowding out teaching activities that create more lasting skills among
students.39 The literature suggests that educators often respond to assessment-
based incentives by coaching students for speciﬁc assessment items or item for-
mats. In fact, studies that examine scores on both high and low stakes assess-
ments for the same population of students oﬀer no evidence that any incentive
scheme induced changes in measured performance on high-stakes assessments
that even come close to fully generalizing to low stakes assessments of the same
material.
Thus, it seems obvious that a key task for those who design future per-
formance pay schemes for teachers is the creation of a series of assessments
that consistently cover a well speciﬁed curriculum but vary substantially in
terms of speciﬁc item content and format. Put more pointedly, the designers
of assessment-based incentive schemes must take seriously the challenge of de-
signing a series of assessments such that the best response of educators is not
to coach but to teach in ways that build true mastery of the intended domain.
Many existing performance pay schemes cannot employ results from such a
series of assessments because these systems are built around a particular psy-
chometric scale, and it would typically not be possible to place results from
assessments of varying formats on a common psychometric scale. However, or-
dinal contests like the pay for percentile scheme described in section 2.7 can
employ the results from such assessments, and a commitment to ordinal con-
tests and tests without repeated items and formats could go a long way toward
eliminating the coaching and test preparation responses that appear to plague
many current and previous systems.
This observation is related to the most obvious lesson generated by the ma-
39Further, Barlevy and Neal (2010) point out that although general score inﬂation does
not beneﬁt teachers who compete in a relative performance scheme, teachers as a group can
still beneﬁt from manipulating the dispersion of scales. If teachers can collectively pressure
testing agencies to compress the distribution of performance metrics, after piece-rates have
been set, the contaminated system will provide weaker incentives but pay out the same total
prize money to teachers.
45terial presented in section 2. Education authorities cannot reasonably expect
to obtain reliable information about secular trends in performance from assess-
ment series that are part of incentive systems. Systems that provide reliable
information about secular trends in performance must involve assessments that
can be properly equated over time, but the overlap in content and format that
makes proper equating possible creates opportunities for the coaching behaviors
that inﬂate scores and compromise the meaning of assessment scales. If educa-
tion oﬃcials desire credible measures of secular progress, they must obtain these
measures from a series of assessments that contain no stakes for educators.
Finally, because taxpayers and their representatives want schools to build
non-cognitive as well as cognitive skills, assessment based incentive schemes
can never be more than one component of a broad system of incentives for
educators. From this starting point, it is clear that assessment based incentive
schemes and voucher systems should not be seen as policy substitutes but rather
policies that may work well together as part of a broader system that requires
schools to compete on several dimensions for access to government funds. By
fostering competition among schools that rewards schools for fostering both the
cognitive and non-cognitive skills of children, education authorities may create
competition among schools for eﬀective teachers that spurs innovation in the
creation of new methods for screening, developing, and rewarding teachers.
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